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Abstract 
We provide a simple formulation of a framework where some extensions of logic program- 
ming with non-monotonic reasoning are treated uniformly, namely, two kinds of negation and 
abduction. The resulting semantics is purely model-theoretic, and gives meaning to any non- 
contradictory abductive logic program. Moreover, it embeds and generalizes some existing se- 
mantics which deal with negation and abduction. The framework is equipped with a correct 
top-down proof procedure. 
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1. Introduction and motivations 
Logic programming (LP) has been widely recognized as a powerful formalism for 
knowledge representation in various artificial intelligence (AI) domains. Both LP and 
AI have greatly benefited from such an interaction. In particular, using logic program- 
ming in typical AI domains has called for various extensions to the basic LP framework 
and for a better understanding of existing extensions, such as negation or abduction. 
Actually, the need of extending pure LP (Horn clauses) to deal with forms of non- 
monotonic reasoning was recognized since the early years of LP. Negation as failure 
was first introduced in [26] to express negative information, and it has been later 
recognized as a suitable form of non-monotonic reasoning. For instance, negation as 
failure provides a simple and elegant solution to the well-known frame problem in AI, 
as exemplified by the so-called “Yale Shooting Problem” [13,31,43]. More recently, 
other extensions have been proposed to further enrich the expressive power of LP in 
order to turn it into a general formalism for knowledge representation (for a survey, 
see [15]). Among others, we mention abductive LP [42,35,48] and LP with different 
forms of negation (e.g., [45,56,46,52,60, lo]). In particular, in [60] it is shown how 
logic programs with two kinds of negation (i.e., default and explicit negation) is ap- 
plied to diverse domains of knowledge representation such as hierarchies and reasoning 
about actions. 
The formalization of these extensions has called for new semantics capable of cap- 
turing their “intended” meaning. Even for the case of negation as failure, a number of 
different characterizations have been defined from different perspectives, most of which 
have been inspired from an interpretation of negation as failure as a more general no- 
tion of negation by default (e.g., [42]). A survey of the semantics of logic programs 
with negation (by default) is reported in [14]. The survey focuses on the proof-theoretic 
and model-theoretic issue, and on their relations. 
Something similar is happening for other extensions such as abductive LP [47] and 
LP with a second form of negation in addition to negation by default (see, for in- 
stance, [45,65,56,60]. For each extension there is no general agreement on what 
its semantics should be. Formal comparisons among different semantics are hard to 
be drawn, mainly because they are often based on different grounds. Furthermore, 
many proposals are based on a proof-theoretic approach rather than on a model- 
theoretic approach, and this constitutes a further obstacle for the study of formal 
properties, and hence formal comparisons, of different proposals. Another crucial is- 
sue is to understand the relations among different extensions. For instance, the rela- 
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tion between negation by default and abduction has been thoroughly studied starting 
from [42]. 
The ongoing proliferation of alternative proposals may ultimately create a sort of 
“labyrinth of LP and NMR” (similar to the labyrinth of LP and Concurrency) with the 
potential risk of getting too far away from LP. For this reason, trying to give a uniform 
view of extended LP which encompasses various extensions proposed so far is an laud- 
able effort. Recently, some work has been done in this direction [6,38,16,33,65,36]. 
For instance, Dung [36] studies the relation between stable and well-founded seman- 
tics for normal logic programs, and shows that stable semantics can be considered 
as a “two-valued well-founded semantics”. Other authors [16,47,40] have pointed out 
that the framework of [35] is in fact an argumentation approach to logic programming 
and non-monotonic reasoning. In Dung’s later work [38,39], the intuitive notions of 
arguments and attack between arguments has been adopted both for reconstructing a 
number of NMR formalisms and for understanding different semantics of extended LP 
in a quite simple way. Inspired by the work of Dung, in [16] a general assumption- 
based framework for non monotonic reasoning has been developed, within which, 
again, many semantics for extended logic programming can be easily reconstructed. 
Still the choice of employing an argumentation-based framework, though simple and 
powerful, may be seen as a departure from the standard formalisms which are widely 
employed within the LP community. Moreover, at the time being, the absence of a 
model-theory for Dung’s argumentation framework constitutes an obstacle to the study 
of formal properties which are typically based on model-theoretic grounds, such as 
compositionality. 
A further valuable work, but not based on argumentation, is that by Alferes and 
Pereira [6], where the authors define a parameterizable schema to encompass and char- 
acterize a diversity of semantics involving two kinds of negation (namely default nega- 
tion and classical, strong, weak, pseudo or explicit negation). 
The goal of this paper is not to propose yet another semantics for LP and 
its extensions. Instead, our aim is to provide a simple formulation of a unified 
LP-based semantic framework within which three main extensions of LP for 
NMR are treated uniformly, namely two forms of negation and abduction. Our se- 
mantics is based on the well known notion of Herbrand models for definite Horn 
programs, since (extended) logic programs are simply viewed as definite (Horn) pro- 
grams, through the notion of positive version of a program. Intuitively the idea is 
to restrict, in a step-wise fashion, the set of Herbrand models of the positive version 
of a program in order to identify the intended models of the original 
program. 
This paper is an extended version of a previous paper [20], where we have applied 
these ideas to the case of normal logic programming, that is logic programming with 
negation by default. In [20], we provided an alternative characterization of the semantics 
of normal logic programs, based on purely model-theoretic arguments, which allowed 
us to reconstruct and compare existing, and seemingly different, proposals, such as 
Przymusinski’s stationary semantics [65] and Dung’s preferential semantics [35]. In this 
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paper, we first present the results of [20] ’ in a slightly different way, partly inspired 
on the work of [38,16]. This allows us next to naturally generalize the approach to 
other extensions of logic programming, namely those including a second form negation 
and abduction with integrity constraints. The final outcome is a semantics framework, 
based on model-theoretic grounds, within which these extensions can be accommodated 
in an easy and uniform way. 
An interesting issue related to a semantic characterization is the study of the equiva- 
lence notion it induces with particular reference to compositionality and fully abstract- 
ness properties [54]. In the paper, we will discuss this topic, and, in particular, we will 
show how the compositionality property can be easily accommodated in our semantic 
framework, thanks to its model-theoretic grounds. 
We also develop an abstract specification of a proof-procedure for the overall frame- 
work, which is a simple extension of the proof-procedure for abductive logic program- 
ming, first presented in [42] and further developed in [35,48,47]. The proof-procedure 
is shown to be sound and weakly complete with respect to the model-theory. 
2. Preliminaries 
Let us first set up some basic notations and terminology. We shall use the basic con- 
cepts of logic programming (e.g., as in [12]). Lowercase letters (possibly subscripted) 
denote atoms (e.g., a, b, c, . . .) and liter& (e.g., 1, lo,. . .). The standard terminology 
must be extended to deal with the extensions of logic programming we are dealing 
with. In particular, we will need to distinguish between negation by default, denoted 
by not, and a second form of negation, denoted by 1. 
An extended logic program is a set of rules of the form 
lo + II,..., m, 1 not l,+l,...,not lm+n 
where m, n > 0 and each li (i = 1,. . , m + n) is a literal of the form a or la, where a 
is an atom. 
In the following, since we will always refer to Herbrand interpretations and models, 
we will consider only (possibly infinite) propositional programs. A non-propositional 
program is then understood as a shorthand for the (possibly infinite) set of ground 
rules obtained by instantiating the original rules in all possible ways over the Herbrand 
Universe of the program. 
2.1. Positive version of a program 
By the positive version of an extended program P we mean the definite program 
obtained by replacing negated literals of the form not a, la and not la by new positive 
atoms (following, e.g., [41,65,20]). Given an extended program P, let _Yep’ denote the 
set of all ground atoms a such that either a, not a, la, or not la occurs in P. For 
’ We also include proofs for the results simply stated in [20]. 
A. Brogi et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) I-59 5 
each a E 2’: three new propositional symbols are introduced to represent the default 
negation of a (not-a), the negation la of a (a-), and the default negation of la 
(not-a’). We will use the following notations for the sets of symbols occurring in the 
positive version of a program: 
9; = {a-la E 2;) 5?;=9;usf; 2; = {not_Z ( I E Lq}. 
To point out their intuitive meaning, atoms in &!, dp;, 2: and SF will be referred 
to as positive, negated, standard, and default atoms, respectively. 
The positive version of an extended program P is then obtained by replacing in P 
literals of the form la and not I with the corresponding standard and default atoms 
in 2’; and .9’:, respectively. 
Example 2.1. The positive version of the extended program 
atb,not lc 
a +- not d 
TC +- 
is the definite program 
a +- b,not_c’ 
a +- not-d 
c7 +- 
From now onwards, we will not distinguish any further between an extended program 
P and its positive version. Thus, we will denote directly by P the positive version of 
an extended program. The Herbrand Base of an extended program P is then 
Since an extended program is always viewed as a definite program (viz., its positive 
version), we can talk about a Herbrand interpretation Z of P, as usual, as a subset of 
go. Given an interpretation I, I” (resp., Z’) will stand for the set of default (resp., 
standard) atoms in I, that is I9 = I n 9: (resp., I’ = I f? 9:). 
The natural syntactic correspondence between a standard atom and its negation by 
default is given by the following notion of complement with respect to negation by 
default: 
7 = Iot_, if;e;;;t-” 
{ 
where CI E 9:. The above notion can be lifted to sets of atoms (interpretations) in 
the obvious way. Given an interpretation X C 93 p, its complement x with respect to 
negation by default is 
X={IIZEX}. 
An interpretation Z is total if and only if VL E (_Y+ U .JZ1) either L E Z or z E I. 
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Semantically, the role of the two forms of negation is characterized by two basic 
properties of Herbrand interpretations, that we call consistency and non-contradictori- 
ness. Both these properties can be defined via a notion of satisfaction of integrity 
constraints. Given a program P, by an integrity constraint we mean a denial of the 
form +- I, ,..., I,, with {lt,..., In} CBP. 
Definition 2.1. Let P be an extended logic program and let @ be a set of denials of the 
form +- Ii , . . . , I,, with {Ii,. . . , I,} C i@p. Let also I & ?2lp be an interpretation. Given 
4 E @, we say that I satisjies I$ (denoted by I b 4) if and only if {Ii,. . . , I,,} E I. 
Moreover, we say that I satisfies @ (denoted by I k @) if and only if I b 4, for 
each 4 E Qi. 
Two sets of integrity constraints, IC’ and IF’, are associated with (the positive 
version of) an extended program P. (In the sequel, we write simply 3, 9’+,. . . instead 
of 3t?p, .Y+ P,. . .when this does not lead to ambiguity.) 
Definition 2.2. Let P be an extended program. The integrity constraints associated with 
P are the the following two (possibly infinite) sets of denials: 
IC’ = {+ a, a7 1 a E zY+}, ICY” = {c I, not-1 1 I E .JP} 
The notions of consistency and non-contradictoriness of an interpretation can now 
be given as follows. 
Definition 2.3. Let P be an extended program and I C_ 39 be a Herbrand interpretation. 
Then 
(i) I is consistent if and only if I + ZC ‘Of I is inconsistent otherwise. .
(ii) I is non-contradictory if and only if I k IC’. I is contradictory otherwise. 
Namely, an interpretation I is consistent if it does not make both 1 and not-1 true, 
for any standard atom 1, that is, if and only if Z 0 7 = 0. On the other hand, I is 
non-contradictory if it does not make both a and a7 true, for any standard atom a. 
2.2. Supported interpretations for definite programs 
Our semantics for extended logic programs, considering both negation and abduction 
with integrity constraints, is built upon the semantics characterization of normal logic 
programs, that is, logic programs with negation by default presented in [20]. 
The starting point is the characterization of the supported interpretations for definite, 
ground programs. The concept of supported interpretations adopted here is inherited 
from a similar concept first introduced in [22] and then exploited in [20]. In [22] sup- 
ported interpretations are used to provide an alternative characterization of the standard 
Herbrand interpretations of a definite logic program, which provides a compositional 
model-theoretic semantics of logic programs (see also Section 6). 
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The notion of supported interpretation that we use (Definition 2.4 below) is a general- 
ization of the one presented in [22]. In this section, a logic program P is a propositional 
definite program and 9Z denotes the underlying Herbrand Base. 
Definition 2.4. Let P be a logic program and let X be a predefined subset of 9?‘, called 
the set of assumables. Given a Herbrand interpretation Z c 98 and a set of assumables 
H & SF, we say that Z is supported by H (denoted by Z(H)) if Z is the least Herbrand 
model of the program P U H. 
It is worth noting that the notion of supported interpretation of [22] coincides with 
the one given in the previous definition when the set of assumables is the whole 
Herbrand Base a. Indeed, the Herbrand models of a definite logic program P are just 
supported interpretations with respect to the set of assumables ~4? = @, as shown in 
[22]. Moreover, for any predefined set of assumables 2, the standard least Herbrand 
model of a program P is obviously the interpretation supported by the empty set of 
assumables. It is also worth noting that the same interpretation Z can be supported by 
different sets of assumables, as the following example shows. 
Example 2.2. Let P be the program 
P: 
and let the set of assumables be Y? = {p}. Clearly the least Herbrand model of P, 
namely {p, q} is supported both by 0 and by {p}. 
The semantics of the various extensions of logic programming we are going to deal 
with will be given by defining in each case which subset of .9 is taken as the predefined 
set of assumables, and by identifying a subset of the supported interpretations as the 
intended models of the extended program. 
As a first example, if the initial program P is a definite logic program, its standard 
meaning (i.e. its least Herbrand model) can be simply reconstructed by taking &‘ = 0 
and then by considering the unique supported interpretation M(0). 
3. Negation by default 
3.1. Model theory 
Let us first consider the case of logic programs with negation by default, usually 
referred to as normal logic programs. (Notice that the definitions and results stated in 
this section have been already presented in [20], where no proof was included.) 
(The positive version of) A normal logic program is a set of rules of the form 
a c Il,...,ln 
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where a is a positive atom and each li is either a positive atom or a negation by default 
atom not-b, b being a positive atom. In other words, normal logic programs are such 
that P = 8. Hence, 9’ = .P and Z9 reduces to the set {nota 1 a E .P}. 
The set of assumables in this case is the set of default atoms in the Herbrand Base, 
that is 
The definition of supported interpretation (Definition 2.4) can be suitably instantiated 
according to the above definition of the set of assumables J? for normal programs. 
Definition 3.1. Let P be a normal logic program, and let H s Tg be a set of assum- 
ables. A Herbrand interpretation I & a is supported by H if I is the least Herbrand 
model of P U H. 
Intuitively speaking, a supported interpretation I(H) corresponds to assuming the 
truth of a set of default hypotheses, that is, a set of default atoms of the form not-a. 
This view basically corresponds to the abductive interpretation of negation by default, 
first introduced in [42] and further refined in [35]. 
Example 3.1. Consider the program P: 
a + not-b 
The Herbrand Base associated with P is g = {a, b, not-a, not-b} and the set of assum- 
ables is .JZ9 = {not_a,not_b}. The supported interpretations for P are then 
0 supported by 0 
{not_u} supported by {not-u} 
{a, notb} supported by {notb} 
{a, not-u, not&} supported by {not_a,not_b} 
Intuitively speaking, a supported interpretation represents a possible world where 
some default atoms are assumed to hold. Whether or not a supported interpretation 
can be taken as an intended model of the original normal program depends on various 
issues. First of all, a supported interpretation has to be consistent, in the sense of 
Definition 2.3 (that is, it should not make both a and note true for any given atom a). 
Definition 3.2. Let P be a normal program. A supported interpretation I(H) of P is a 
supported model of P if it is consistent. 
Secondly, any supported model must satisfy an admissibility condition which we are 
going to discuss next and which is the basis of the proposed semantics for negation by 
default. It is worth noting that such a condition is a reconstruction, in the framework 
of supported interpretations, of the admissibility condition introduced by Dung [35] in 
his definition of the preferential semantics for normal logic programs. As shown in 
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[20], our formulation of admissibility allows us to easily reconstruct also the stationary 
semantics for normal logic programming introduced by [65]. This allows us to make a 
formal comparison of the two approaches within the unifying framework of supported 
interpretations. 
The notion of admissibility relies on a notion of conservative xtension of a sup- 
ported model. A supported model may be extended by enlarging the set of assumables 
(i.e. default atoms). Namely, the extensions of a supported model Z(H) are all the 
supported interpretations which assume more default hypotheses than H. If we look at 
supported models as representing consistent possible worlds, the extension of a model 
represents a richer world where more defaults are assumed to hold. Clearly, when en- 
riching the set of defaults of a possible world, we are interested only in assuming new 
defaults nota such that a is not true in the world we start with, so as not to move 
into an inconsistent world. The extensions of a supported model Z which satisfy this 
property are the conservative xtensions of I. An interpretation I is then admissible if 
all its conservative extensions do not contradict the default hypotheses of I. In other 
words, a supported model is admissible if there is no way to conservatively extend 
it and to defeat some of its default assumptions. These notions are formalized in the 
next two definitions. In Section 3.2.1, we will also present an argumentation based 
interpretation of these notions, along the lines of the work of [38]. 
Definition 3.3. Let P be a normal program and let Z(H) and J(K) be two supported 
interpretations. Let also Z(H) be consistent. Then, J(K) is a conservative extension of 
Z(H) if and only if K > Z-Z and x n I = 0. Given a supported interpretation I, CE(Z) 
denotes the set of the conservative extensions of I. 2 
Notice that .Z can extend I by enlarging the set of default atoms (assumables) which 
are not inconsistent with 1. In fact, the condition (KnZ) = 0 in the previous definition 
states that there is no atom a in Z such that nota is assumed in J. Furthermore, J 
may be possibly inconsistent even if Z is consistent. 
Example 3.2. Consider again program P 
a +- not-b 
It is easy to see that each supported interpretation of P conservatively extends the model 
supported by the empty set. On the other hand, there is no conservative extension of the 
supported model {a, not-b} since its only extension {a, not_a,notb} is not consistent 
with it (viz. {not_a,notb} n {a,notb} = {a}(# 8)). 
The admissibility of a supported model depends on its conservative extensions. A 
supported model I is admissible if none of its conservative extensions defeats the 
default assumptions in I. 
*With abuse of notation, we write CE(Z) instead of C&I(H)). 
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Definition 3.4. Let P be a normal program. A supported model I(H) is an admissible 
model if and only if for any conservative extension J(K) of I, ?? n J = 0. 
Remark 3.1. Notice that, for normal programs, a supported model I(H) is admissible 
if and only if the following property holds: 
(Va E gV’. not-a E H + (VJ E G?(I). a $ J)). 
As mentioned before, a supported interpretation must be both consistent and admis- 
sible in order to be taken as a candidate intended model of a program. 
Once we have determined the admissible models of a normal program, we wish to 
identify those which, intuitively, assume as many default hypotheses as possible. A 
complete model is then a model which assumes all (and only) the defaults nota such 
that a is not true in all its conservative extensions. 
Definition 3.5. Let P be a normal program. An admissible model Z(H) C $? is a com- 
plete model of P if and only if the following property holds: 
(Va E &@.(not_a E H % (VJ E GE(I) : a $4 J))). 
In the next section we will show that complete models coincide with Dung’s com- 
plete scenarios [35,40]. The following proposition is then a direct consequence of the 
results of [35,40]. 
Proposition 3.1. Let P be a normal program. Then: 
(i) P has at least one complete model; 
(ii) Any total supported model of P is a complete model of P. 
Moreover, we will show that our framework allows one to reconstruct Przymusinski’s 
stationary semantics [65]. As a byproduct, we obtain a formal result which states that 
Dung’s and Przymusinski’s semantics coincide. 
3.2. Related work 
In this section, we discuss the relations between the semantics for negation by default 
presented in the previous section and other approaches to the semantics of normal logic 
programming. We first present the relations with Dung’s preferential semantics and 
Przymusinski’s stationary semantics. (These results were Iirst stated in [20].) As already 
mentioned, a unified view of these semantics provides a formal result of equivalence 
between them. This equivalence can be further extended to Sac& and Zaniolo’s partial 
stable models semantics [69] by exploiting the results of [50,73], thus establishing the 
equivalence of the three main approaches to the semantics of normal logic programming 
presented so far. Finally, we mention the relations with other semantics of normal 
logic programming, such as the stable model semantics of [44] and the well-founded 
semantics of [72]. 
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3.2.1. Preferential semantics 
In [35], Dung exploited the treatment of negation as hypothesis in logic programming 
first introduced in [42], in order to set up a simple semantics for logic programs with 
negation by default. The main idea is to look at negative literals as possible abductive 
hypotheses, and this has highly inspired subsequent proposals, including ours. In [35] 
and [40] the semantics of a program P is given through the notion of admissible 
extensions of the theory represented by P. An extension (called scenario) is obtained 
by augmenting P with a set of abductive hypotheses H. Stated otherwise a scenario is 
a theory P U H, with H g .YS. 
Let us recall the basic notions and results of [35]. To do this, we do not follow the 
original presentation of [35] but rather a different, though equivalent, argumentation- 
theoretic formulation first presented in [47] and further refined in [16,38,40]. The 
reason is that the argumentation-theoretic view of these concepts is quite simple and 
intuitive. Moreover, to better understand the relations with our framework, we restate 
these notions by adopting as much as possible the terminology and notations set up in 
Section 2. 
As mentioned above, the semantics of a normal program P is given in terms of ad- 
missible scenaria of the form PUH, where H c JCY9 is a set of default assumptions. The 
admissibility condition of a scenario is based on an argumentation-theoretic riterion 
[38]. Roughly speaking, an admissible set of assumptions must be able to successfully 
“counter-attack” any other set of assumptions which “attacks” it. Intuitively speaking, 
a set of assumptions corresponds to a set of arguments which are able to defeat any 
counter-argument against them. The key notion is then the notion of attack between 
sets of arguments. 
Definition 3.6. Let P be a normal program and let H, K C _Y@ be two sets of assum- 
ables. Then H attacks K if and only if 
3not_a E K. P U H t- a 
Remark 3.2. In the above definition, since P is viewed as a positive program, t stands 
for the standard provability relation in Horn clause logic. Hence, 
A scenario is a theory P U H such that H does not attack itself. 
Definition 3.7. Let P be a normal program. A scenario is a theory P U H, where 
H C LYg is such that H does not attack H. 
Among scenaria, Dung identifies as admissible those which are able to (counter-) 
attack any attack against them. We call them D-admissible scenaria in order to avoid 
confusion with our notion of admissibility. 
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Definition 3.8. Let P be a normal program. A scenario P U H is D-admissible if and 
only if 
QE C Yg. E attacks H + H attacks E 
Notice that “E attacks H” means that P U E t- a for some nota E H, that is E is 
“evidence” for the contrary a of some hypothesis not-a E H. The D-admissibility of 
a scenario P U H can then be informally explained as the ability of H to defeat any 
evidence for the contrary of any hypothesis in H. 
The preferential semantics of a program P is given by the set of all its maximal 
D-admissible scenaria, called preferred extensions in [35]. 
Definition 3.9. Let P be a normal program. A preferred extension of P is a maximal 
(with respect to set inclusion) D-admissible scenario. 
As shown in [35], preferred extensions can also be viewed as the maximal ele- 
ments in the space of complete scenaria. Again, we refer to them as D-complete 
scenaria in order to avoid confusion with our notion of completeness. A scenario 
P U H is D-complete if it contains all the hypotheses acceptable with respect to 
it, that is it contains any hypothesis nota such that H (counter-)attacks any attack 
to {not_u}. 
Definition 3.10. Let P be a normal program. A D-admissible scenario P U H is D- 
complete if and only if 
H = {nota E 2” 1 VI3 c Zg. E attacks {not-a} + H attacks E} 
The following proposition summarizes the main results of [35]. 
Proposition 3.2. Let P be a normal program. Then: 
(i) P admits at least one preferred extension; 
(ii) P admits at least one D-complete scenario; 
(iii) The well-founded model of P corresponds to the least (w.r. t set inclusion) 
D-complete scenario. 
We are now in the position of stating the direct correspondence between D-complete/ 
D-admissible scenaria and complete/admissible models. First of all, notice that there is 
an obvious direct correspondence between supported models and scenaria. 
Proposition 3.3. Let P be a normal program, H C 2’g and M(H) be the interpreta- 
tion supported by H. Then, P U H is a scenario H M(H) is consistent. Moreover, 
foreacha~9+,a~MW~PuHtaa. 
Proof. Trivial. 0 
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Moreover we can easily relate the definitions of attack, and then D-admissibility, in 
terms of properties of supported interpretations as follows. 
Proposition 3.4. Let P be a normal program, H, K C_ _Y@ and I(H), J(K) the inter- 
pretations supported by H,K respectively. Then H attacks K % x C’ I # 8. 
Proof. 
H attacks K 
ti {Definition 3.6) 
3not_a E K. P U H F a 
@ {remark 3.2) 
3not_a E K. a E TPUH t w 
* {definition 3.1) 
3not_a E K. a E I 
* {not-a = a} 
nlZ#0 0 
The next theorem relates Dung’s admissible scenaria and admissible models, by 
showing that they actually coincide for each normal program. Notice that, in Dung’s 
definition (Definition 3.8) the admissibility of a scenario PUH requires that H is able 
to counter-attack any attack E against it. In our view (Definition 3.4) the admissibility 
of a supported model Z(H) requires instead that for any K such that J(K) is a con- 
servative extension of Z(H), K does not attack H. 3 These apparently different notions 
are reconciled by the next theorem. 
Theorem 3.5. Let P be a normalprogram and H C 2X3’. Then, M(H) is an admissible 
model of P w P U H is an admissible scenario of P. 
Proof. =+-: Let M(H) be an admissible model of P. We need to show that P U H 
is an admissible scenario. First of all, P U H is a scenario, since M(H) is consistent 
(proposition 3.3). We need to show that P U H is admissible, i.e. 
‘dE C _Y9.E attacks H + H attacks E. 
Assume P U H is not admissible, that is, by Definition 3.8, 
3E C _YB.E attacks H A H does not attack E. 
Then, let I(E) be the interpretation supported by E. We have 
3E C_ _@@.E attacks H A H does not attack E 
@ {Proposition 3.4) 
3Ec4P?%lI#(b A ??nM=@ (1) 
3 Notice that in Dung’s semantics evidence to the contrary may be inconsistent. As well, in our approach 
conservative extensions may be possibly inconsistent. 
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Let now K = H U E and consider the interpretation J(K). Then J E CE(M), since 
(i) K > H by construction; 
(ii) K f~ M = 8, since M n p = 0 (by the consistency of M) and M n i? = 0 (by 
(1) above). 
Since I s J, by (1) above we have R n J # 0, thus contradicting the fact that M(H) 
is an admissible model. 
x=: Assume P U H is a D-admissible scenario. Then M(H) is consistent by Propo- 
sition 3.3. Assume M(H) is not an admissible interpretation, that is 
3J(K) E CE(M). J n E # 8. 
We have 
3J(K) E C!?(M). J(K) n ?f # 0 
* {Proposition 3.4) 
3J(K) E CE(M). K attacks H 
+ {Definitions 3.4 and 3.3) 
3K&5&@.KnM =0 A K attacks H 
ti {Proposition 3.4) 
3K 5 _Y9. H does not attack K A K attacks H. 
Thus we have a contradiction with the D-admissibility of P U H. 0 
Finally, we establish a one-to-one correspondence between complete models and 
D-complete scenarios. 
Theorem 3.6. Let P be a normal program, H C 9’ and M(H) the interpretation 
supported by H. Then, M(H) is a complete model of P ti P U H is a D-complete 
scenario. 
Proof. +: Assume M(H) is a complete model. Then, by Theorem 3.5, P U H is 
D-admissible. Assume it is not D-complete. Then, by Definition 3.10, 
Sot-a E 9’. not-a $ H A (YE C _Y@“. E attacks {nota} =S H attacks E), 
or equivalently 
flnot-a @’ H. (YE 2 2”. H does not attack E + E does not attack {not-a}). (1) 
Let J(K) be any conservative extension of M(H). Then, by Definition 3.3 and by 
Proposition 3.4, we have that H does not attack K. Then, by (1) above, we have 
3not_a @ H. (VJ E CE(M). a @J), 
thus contradicting the fact that M(H) is complete. 
+: Assume that PUH is a D-complete scenario. Then M(H) is an admissible model 
by theorem 3.5. Assume that M(H) is not complete, that is, by Definition 3.5, 
3not_a @ H. @J(K) E CE(M). a @‘J). (2) 
By (2) and the D-completeness of P U H, we have 
3E 2 5@. E attacks {not-u} A H does not attack E. (3) 
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Let now K = HUE, and J(K) be the interpretation supported by K. Then, J E CE(M), 
since 
(i) H fl M = 0, by the consistency of M, and 
(ii) En M = 8, by (3) above, since H does not attack E. 
Moreover, since by (3) E attacks {not-u} and by construction EC K, we also have 
that K attacks {not-u}, or equivalently a E J(K). Thus we have that J(K) E CE(M) 
and a E J(K), thus contradicting (2). 0 
3.2.2. Stationury semantics 
In [65], Przymusinski interprets negation in (disjunctive) normal programs as nega- 
tion by default. The negation by default not 4 of a propositional formula 4 is treated as 
a new propositional symbol. The introduction of default propositions not-4 allows one 
to deal with both classical negation 14 and negation by default not 4. In Przymusin- 
ski’s framework, a formula 4 of the form a or la is called an objective proposition, 
while not-4 is called a default proposition. Since not-a is considered as a new predi- 
cate symbol, and classical negation is also taken into account, we talk about consistency 
and inconsistency in the classical sense, as opposed to our notions of consistency and 
inconsistency (see Definition 2.3). 
In the sequel we recall the basic definitions and results of [65]. The basic idea is 
to define the semantics of a program P in terms of its stationary expansions, namely 
theories obtained by augmenting P with some default propositions of the form nota 
or lnot_a, and by imposing a stationarity condition on them. Let us go into the details 
of Przymusinski’s definitions. Let then P be a normal program and T an expansion 
of P, that is a theory obtained by augmenting P with some default propositions of 
the form not-a or lnot_a. In the sequel, we will use the classical notions of Herbrand 
interpretations and models of a theory T. Recall that, given a theory T, a Herbrand 
interpretation I of T can be identified with a subset of the Herbrand base _Y+ U _fi@. 
Given an interpretation I, a default or objective proposition 4 of the kind a or not-a 
is true in 1 if 4 E I, and it is false in I otherwise. Moreover, I is a model of T if it 
satisfies all the statements in 7’. 
Definition 3.11. Let P be a normal program and T an expansion of P. A model M 
of T is minimal if and only if there is no model N of T such that N c M and N 
coincides with M on default propositions. We denote by MIN(T) the class of all 
minimal models of a theory T. 
According to [65], if a formula 4 is true in all minimal models of T, we write T k=min 
4. 4 Among the expansions of a program P, Przymusinski identifies as stationary those 
expansions T which are obtained by adding to the original program P some default 
4 As pointed out in [65], this notion of minimal model corresponds to considering predicate circumscription 
CIRC( T; 0; D) of the theory T, in which objective propositions 0 are minimized and default propositions 
D are fixed. 
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propositions of the form not-a (resp. Tnot-a), in such a way that the corresponding 
objective propositions a are false (resp. true) in all minimal models of T. 
Definition 3.12. Let P be a normal program, H C_ P3 and K C{Tnot_a ) not-o E 
Z’}. The theory T = P U H U K is a stationary expansion of P if and only if it is 
non-contradictory and satisfies the conditions: 
(Sl) T k not-a N T krnin ya 
(S2) T + vzota w T k a 
for any objective proposition a (i.e. a E 2P). 
Let us illustrate the above definition through a simple example. 
Example 3.3. Consider the following program P, taken from [65]: 
a + not-b 
b + not-a 
c c a,b 
This program has three stationary expansions, namely: 
TO=P 
T1 = P U {not-a, lnot_b, not-c} 
TZ = P U {not-b, vzota, not-c} 
Notice that Tl and T2 have only one minimal model, namely: 
A41 = {b, not-a, vzot_b, not-c} 
n/i, = {a, not-b, vm_a, not-c} 
respectively. 
In order to state the relation between stationary expansions and complete models of 
a program P, we first need to relate the framework of supported interpretations to the 
one of theories and expansions of theories. This is achieved by the following definition. 
Definition 3.13. Let P be a normal program, Z(H) be a supported interpretation of P 
and T be an expansion of P. Then 
(i) F(Z), the theory associated with I, is defined as follows: 
.F(Z)=PUHU{lnota ( UEZ’} 
(ii) Y(T), the supported interpretation associated with T, is the supported inter- 
pretation J(K) such that K = T n _Yg. 
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The next two propositions clarify the meaning of the above mapping, by showing 
the correspondence between minimal models of theories and conservative extensions 
of supported interpretations. More precisely, the first proposition states that for any 
supported model Z(H), the set of conservative extensions of Z coincides with the set 
of minimal models of F(Z). On the other hand, the second proposition states that, for 
any theory T satisfying condition (S2) of definition 3.12, the set of minimal models 
of T coincides with the set of conservative extensions of Y(T). 
Proposition 3.7. Let P be a normal program and Z(H) be a supported model. Then 
J(K) is a conservative xtension of Z H J is a minimal model of F(Z). 
Proof. +: Z(H) is consistent. Let J(K) be a conservative extension of I. We first 
show that J is a model of F(Z), that is: 
(1) not-a E F(Z) + not-a E J 
(2) lnot-a E F(Z) + not-a @J 
(3) for each rule a +-- bl, . . , b,,,not_q,. . . , not-c, in P we have: 
{b I,..., b,,not_q ,..., not_c,}CJ + aEJ 
Proof of (1): 
not-a E F(Z) 
=+ {by construction of F(Z)} 
not-a E H 
=+ {H c K, since J(K) is a conservative extension of Z(H)} 
not-a E K 
@ {K = J”} 
not-a E J 
Proof of (2): 
7not-a E F(Z) 
* {by construction of F(Z)} 
aEZ 
* {?? n Z = 0, since J(K) is a conservative extension of Z(H)} 
not-a # K 
@ {K = Jg} 
not-a @J 
Proof of (3): Let a + b,,. . ., b,,not-cl,. . .,not_c, be a rule in P such that: 
{b,, . . . , b,,not_q,. . ,not_c,,,} CJ. 
Then a E J since J is a supported interpretation. 
Next, we need to show that J(K) is minimal. This is again a consequence of the 
supportedness of J. In fact, assume that J is not minimal, i.e. there exists a model M 
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of F(Z) such that: 
(1) A4 agrees with J on default propositions 
(2) for some a E 98: a E J A a $! M. 
a E J means a E TP”K t o, i.e. 3n. a E TP”K 1‘ n. We show, by induction on n, that 
a E TP"K T n + a EM. (*) 
The base case is obvious. Assume (*) holds for each h < n, and let a be such that 
u~ThTn A u$z’Tp”Kr(n-l).Wehave: 
a E TPUK T n 
=+ {definition of Tp,, T n} 
3u t b, b not_q,...,not_cm in P. >...> n, 
{bl,. .,b,,not_cj,. ,not_c,} C TpUK r (n - 1) 
3 {inductive hypothesis} 
3u t b, b not_cl,...,not_c, in P. ,..., n, 
{bl,. . , b,} CM A {not-q,. . . ,not_c,} c K 
=+ {prope@ ( 1) of M 1 
3u +- bl,. . , b,,not_q,. . . ,not_c, in P: 
{b 1,. . . , b,} CM A {not-cl,. . .,not_c,} & M 
=3 {M is a model of F(Z)} 
aEA4 
hence we get a contradiction with (2). 
+: Let J E MZN(.F(I)), and let K = J n 2”. By Definition 3.3, we have to show: 
(0) J is supported by K; 
(1) KZH; 
(2) K n I = 0. 
Proof of (0): Let M be the interpretation supported by K, that is: 
.MP=K 
l M’ = (TPUK 1 0)“. 
M is a model of .?(I) by construction. Since M agrees with J on default propositions, 
A4 = J by the minimality of J, hence J is supported. 
Proof of (1): 
not-a E H 
=3 {construction of F(I)} 
not-u E F(I) 
=+ {J is a model of F(I)} 
not-a E J 
u {J” = K} 
not-u E K 
Proof of (2): 
UEI 
=+ {construction of F(I)} 
Tzota E F(I) 
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=+ {J is a model of F(Z)} 
not-a $! J 
w {J% = K} 
nota @K 0 
Proposition 3.8. Let P be a normal program and let T be a theory satisfying condi- 
tion (S2) of Dejnition 3.12. Then, J is a minimal model of T ti J is a conservative 
extension of Y(T). 
Proof. Let 
H = Y(T)’ and K = J2 
+: Assume J is a minimal model of T. By Definition 3.3, we need to show: 
(1) HCK 
(2) K n Y(T) = 8. 
Proof of (1): 
not-a E H 
=+ {construction of Y(T)} 
not-a E T 
* {J model of T} 
not-a E J 
w {JS = K} 
not-a E K 
Proof of (2): 
a E Y(T) 
=+ {construction of Y(T) and J minimal model of T} 
aEJ 
=S {property (S2) of T} 
not-a @J 
% {J’ = K} 
not-a @’ K 
-c=: Assume J is a conservative extension of Y’(T). We need to show: 
(i) not-a E T + not-a E J 
(ii) -wot_a E T + not-a +Z J 
(iii) for each rule a +- bl,. . . , b,,not_cl,. . . ,not_c, in P 
{bl,..., b,,not_cl,..., not_c,}CJ+aEJ 
Proof of(i): 
not-a E T 
=+ {by construction of Y(T)} 
not-a E H 
=+ {H C K, since J(K) E CE(Y(T))} 
nota E K 
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H {J9 = K} 
not-a E J 
Proof of (ii): 
1not-a E T 
=S {property (5’2) of T and construction of Y(T)} 
a E Y(T) 
=+ {K n Y(T) = 0, since J E CE(Y(T))} 
nota $ K 
* {Jg = K} 
not-a #J 
Proof of (iii): Let a +- bl, . . . , b,, not-cl,. . . , not-c, be a rule in P such that 
{b I,. . . , b,,not_q, . . . ,not_c,} C J 
Hence a E J by supportedness of J. The proof of minimality of J is analogous to the 
proof in Proposition 3.7. 0 
We can finally prove the main result which states that there is a one-to-one corre- 
spondence between complete models and stationary expansions. 
Theorem 3.9. Let P be a normal program. Then: 
(i) if M is a complete model of P, then F(M) is a stationary expansion of P 
(ii) if T is a stationary expansion of P, then Y(T) is a complete model of P. 
Proof. Proof of (i): We have to show that F(M) satisfies both conditions (Sl) and 
(S2) of Definition 3.12. 
Proof of (S2): F(M) + lnot-a * F(M) + a 
+: 
WW k a 
* {definition of + } 
Vh4 E MIN(F(M)) : a E A4 
+ {Proposition 3.7, M is consistent} 
VNECE(M):aEN’ 
* {M E CE(WI 
aEM’ 
=+ {Construction of S(M)} 
wotA E F(M) 
=+ 
3(M) k Inot-a 
=+: 
F(M) + 7zot_a 
=+ {definition of b } 
VA4 E MIN(F(M)) : not-a @ A4 
* {proposition 3.7, A4 is consistent} 
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VN E CE(M) : not-a # N9 
=+ {definition of CE(M)} 
aEM’ 
=+ {definition of CE(M)} 
‘dNECE(M):aEN 
=+ {Proposition 3.7) 
k’M E MZN(F(M)) : a E M 
=+ 
WW k a 
Proof of (Sl): F(M) b not-a * F(M) kmin Ta 
y(M) kn la 
@ {definition of /=min} 
VM E MIN(F(M)) : a @ A4 
ti {proposition 3.8) 
‘dN~cE(A4):aeN 
* (A4 is a complete model of P } 
not-a E A4 
* {definition of ,F} 
not-a E F(M) 
(3 
qI4) b notdz 
Proof of (ii): We need to show that Y(T)g = {not_a(VN E CE(Y(T)) : a 6 N} 
not-a E Y(T) 
H {definition 3.13 of Y} 
not-a E T 
* {T is a stationary expansion} 
r(M) kmin 72 
* {definition of kmin } 
tlM E MIN(F(M)) : a # M 
* {Proposition 3.8 since T satisfies (S2)) 
VN E CE(Y(T)) : a @‘N 0 
As a corollary of Theorem 3.6 and theorem 3.9, we have one important result which 
states the equivalence between D-complete scenaria and stationary expansions of a 
normal program P. 
Corollary 3.10. Let P be a normal program. Then: 
(i) if P U H is a D-complete scenario of P then P U H U {lnotala E TP”H T o} 
is a stationary expansion of P. 
(ii) if T is a stationary expansion of P then PU(Tfl_Y@) is a D-complete scenario 
of P. 
22 A. Brogi et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) 1-59 
As it will be discussed in Section 4, Theorem 3.9 holds for normal logic programs 
only and does not apply to the case of logic programs with two kinds of negations. 
3.2.3. Stable and well-founded semantics 
It is also worth observing that both stationary semantics and preferential semantics 
extend Gelfond and Lifschitz’s stable model semantics [44] for normal programs. In 
fact, the stable models of a program P (if any) coincide with total stationary expansions 
and complete scenaria. Notably, the same result can be restated in our framework as 
follows. 
Proposition 3.11. Let P be a program and MC SK Then M is a stable model of P 
H M U {not-ala $ M} is a total model of P. 
Proof. Straightforward, since from Proposition 3.l(ii) we have that total models (and 
therefore stable models) are indeed complete, and complete models are equivalent o 
3-valued stable models. Cl 
Finally, both Dung and Przymusinski have related their semantics to the well-founded 
semantics defined in [72]. Indeed, given a program P, both the least complete scenario 
and the least stationary expansion correspond to the well-founded model of P. Thus, as 
a consequence of the results of previous sections, the least complete model corresponds 
to the well-founded model. 
Proposition 3.12. Let P be a program and W = n{M ) M is a complete model of P}. 
Then W is still a complete model, and it corresponds to the well-founded model of 
P, that is: 
Mw = W’ U {la(nota E Wa} 
is the well-founded model of P. 
Proof. Straightforward, from Theorem 3.6 and results in [35]. 0 
4. Other forms of negation 
A large body of research (e.g., see [38,45,65,56]) has been recently oriented to 
increase the expressive power of logic programming by introducing other forms of 
negation beyond negation by default. Different kinds of negation have been studied 
in the literature - such as pseudo, classical, strong, weak and explicit negation - 
and their usage for knowledge representation purposes has been investigated (e.g., see 
[lo, 46,52,60]). A general framework dealing with many of these forms of negation 
is described in [6]. 
In this section, we first show how one of these forms of negation, called pseudo 
negation, can be modeled in the framework introduced in the previous section for 
A. Brogi et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) 1-59 23 
normal logic programs. We then discuss how some other forms of negation can be 
accommodated in our framework. 
4.1. Model theory 
Let us first extend the language introduced in Section 3, and consider the case 
of logic programs with two kinds of negation, often referred to as extended logic 
programs. (The positive version of) An extended logic program is a set of rules of 
the form 
lo + ll,..., m, I not-l,+, , . . , not-l,+, 
where each li is a standard atom, i.e., either a positive atom a or the syntactic negation 
of an atom a’. In this case the set of assumables is taken as the set of default atoms 
in the underlying Herbrand Base, that is 
#=P. 
Notice, however, that 
5P = {not-l 1 I E 9”“). 
that is, default atoms can be of the form not-a or rzota7, a being an atom. 
We now define the semantics of negation for programs in this class. If negated atoms 
of the form a’ are viewed as new positive atoms, their negation by default nota’ can 
be treated in the same way as the negation by default nota of ordinary positive atoms 
a was treated in the previous section. Under this view, we could think of employing the 
definitions of supported interpretation, conservative extension, admissible and complete 
model given in the previous section, and take the complete models as the intended 
models of an extended program P. Such a view is however too naive, since it does 
not take into account the non-contradictoriness (in the sense of Definition 2.3(ii)) of 
complete models. The following example illustrates the point. 
Example 4.1. Let P be the program: 
a +- notb 
a’ c notb 
b t nota 
The Herbrand Base associated with P is ?8 = {a, a’, b, b’, not-a, notb, not-a’, not-b’} 
and the set of assumables is X = {not-a, not-a’,not_b,not_b’}. Both {a, a’,notb, 
not-b’} and {b, not-a, not-b’, nota’} are complete models (in the sense of definition 
3.5), but the former is contradictory. 
In order to take contradictions into account, we refine the definition of admissible model 
(Detinition 3.4) by replacing it with the following definition of admissible pre-model. 
The definitions of supported interpretation and conservative extension are instead the 
same as in the previous section (Definitions 2.4 and 3.3). 
24 A. Brogi et al. 1 Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) l-59 
Definition 4.1. Let P be an extended program. A consistent supported interpretation 
Z(H) is an admissible pre-model of P if and only if for any conservative extension 
J(K) of Z(H): 77 n J = 8. 
Notice that the above definition differs from Definition 3.4 for normal programs 
since in the former admissible consistent supported interpretations are called pre-models 
rather than models. Such a distinction is introduced since admissible consistent sup- 
ported interpretations of extended programs may be contradictory. 
Similarly, the analogous of complete models for normal programs are the complete 
pre-models of the next definition. 
Definition 4.2. Let P an extended program. An admissible pre-model Z(H) is a com- 
plete pre-model of P if and only if the following property holds: 
(VZ E 9’.(not_Z E H @ (‘0 E CE(Z(H)) : I@ J))). 
Definition 4.3. Let P be an extended program. An admissible (viz., complete) pre- 
model Z(H) is an admissible (viz., complete) model of P if and only if it is non- 
contradictory. 
The intended meaning of an extended program P is therefore defined by the set of 
its complete models according to Definition 4.3. 
There are however programs which are “inherently” contradictory, as the following 
example shows. 
Example 4.2. Let P be the program: 
a+- 
a’ +- 
The Herbrand Base associated with P is &I = {a, a-, not_u, not-a-} and the set of 
assumables is 2 = {not_a,not_a’}. The interpretation {~,a-} is the only complete 
pre-model of P, but it is not a complete model, since it is contradictory. 
One way to deal with contradictions is to restrict the class of extended programs 
for which the semantics is defined. We therefore introduce a notion of inherently non- 
contradictory program so as to rule out programs such as the program of Example 
4.2. A natural condition is to require that the interpretation supported by the empty 
set of assumables is non-contradictory. For instance, in example 4.2, the interpretation 
supported by the empty set of assumables is contradictory, and hence any supported 
interpretation is contradictory. 
Definition 4.4. An extended program P is non-contradictory if and only if the sup- 
ported interpretation Z(0) is non-contradictory. 
It is worth observing that the non-contradictoriness of a program P does not still 
ensure the existence of a complete model for P, as illustrated by the following example. 
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Example 4.3. Let P be the program: 
a + not-b 
a’ +- not-b 
The Herbrand Base associated with P is: @ = {a, a’, 6, b’, not-a, not-b, not-a’, not-b’} 
The program is non-contradictory, since the interpretation supported by the empty set of 
assumables is simply { }. The only complete pre-model of P is {a,al,not_b,not_bi}, 
which is not a model of P being contradictory. 
Summing up, we defined the semantics of a non-contradictory extended logic pro- 
gram P as the set of complete models for P. We also observed that, even by restricting 
to non-contradictory programs, there are programs for which no complete model exists 
because of contradictions. In section 4.3 we shall discuss how contradictions can be 
dealt with. 
4.2. Related work 
In this section, we discuss the relations between the semantics defined in Section 4.1 
and other approaches to the semantics of extended logic programs. For the moment, 
we do not consider approaches dealing with contradiction which will be considered in 
Section 4.4. 
First of all, we clarify the form of negation we dealt with (namely, pseudo negation) 
by referring to the paper by Alferes and Pereira [6], where a parameterizable schema 
is defined which encompasses and characterizes a diversity of proposed semantics for 
extended logic programs. Among various forms of negation, in this section we consider 
strong negation, classical negation (and the stationary semantics, in particular, [65]) and 
explicit negation coping with the coherence principle [56]. In particular, we relate our 
approach with the (well-founded) semantics defined for explicit negation by Pereira 
and Alferes [.56]. 
Moreover, we show that our complete models (definition 4.3) capture both answer 
set semantics [45] and Przymusinski’s 3-valued stable semantics [64] for extended logic 
programs. Differently from [45,64], the complete model semantics is defined without 
any syntactic transformation on program clauses, but through a rather intuitive concept 
based on the extensibility of Herbrand interpretations. 
Finally, we mention the relationships with other semantics of extended logic pro- 
grams such as the abductive semantics by Brewka and Konolige [ 19,181. 
4.2.1. Other forms of negation 
Alferes and Pereira define in [6] a parameterizable scheme to characterize a vari- 
ety of semantics proposed for extended logic programs. The scheme is parameterized 
w.r.t. two parameters: A set of axioms AX defining l-negation, and a minimality con- 
dition defining not-negation. They show how different semantics for programs with two 
kinds of negation [45,64,65,56] can be modeled by suitably instantiating these two 
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parameters. They also show how other semantics dealing with contradiction removal 
(e.g., [57]) can be accommodated in the scheme. 
It is worth observing that the complete pre-models of an extended program P corre- 
spond to the stationary AX, expansions of P, where the set of axioms AX, is empty. 
Such a correspondence directly follows from the results of Section 3 and from the def- 
inition of stationary AX, expansions of [6]. Complete pre-models hence characterize 
the form of negation called pseudo negation in [6]. Moreover, while the semantics for 
pseudo negation might be inconsistent, complete models define a consistent version of 
stationary semantics with pseudo negation. 
Strong negation is another form of negation defined in [6] by means of a set of 
AXstrong axioms of the form not-u + 4, one for each literal A. Complete models 
do not model properly strong negation, as illustrated by the following example. 
Example 4.4. Consider the program P: 
b’ +- 
a +- nota 
b+a 
As shown in [6], no meaning is associated with P when the syntactic negation 1 is 
interpreted as strong negation. On the other hand, complete models do assign a meaning 
to P since {b’,not_a’} is a complete model of P. 
It is however worth observing that the enforcement of the totality requirement satis- 
fies the axioms AXstrong for strong negation (as well as the coherence principle required 
by explicit negation discussed below). There is hence a one-to-one correspondence be- 
tween the complete total models of a program P and the stable AXstrong models of 
P (as well as with the answer sets of P, being these equivalent to stable AXstrong 
models [6]). 
Alferes and Pereira [6] point out that some semantics for extended logic programs 
are not supportive. The semantics of classical and weak negation are examples of non 
supportive semantics. 
Definition 4.5 (Alferes and Pereira [6]). A semantics is necessarily supportive if, for 
any program P, whenever M is a stationary (resp. stable) model of P then, for every 
standard literal 1 if 1 E M then there exists at least one rule in P of the form 1 + 
bi b not-cl,... ,..., n, , not-c, such that {bl, . . . , b,, not-cl,. . , not-c,} CM. 
It is easy to observe that our semantics cannot directly reconstruct non supportive 
semantics, since our interpretations are all supported by definition. Stationary semantics 
[65] deals with classical negation as well as with negation by default, and it relies on 
the principles of minimization and predicate circumscription (see Section 3.2.2 for the 
case of normal logic programs). The equivalence result between complete models and 
stationary expansions stated in Section 3.2.2 (Theorem 3.9) for normal logic programs 
does not extend to the case of extended logic programs. 
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Example 4.5. Consider the program: 
p + 7a 
p+a 
The meaning of this program in our semantics is the complete model {not-a,not-a’, 
not_p,not_lp}. On the other hand, stationary semantics allows one to conclude that 
p holds, because of the tertium non datur property of classical negation. 
One way to reconstruct non-supportive semantics in our framework is to extend 
the program with rules suitably coping with the axioms of the various semantics. For 
instance, Pereira and Alferes [6] show that classical negation can be reconstructed by 
introducing disjunction axioms of the form a V 1 a, and strong negation axioms of the 
kind not a + 1 a. 
Pereira and Alferes introduced in [56] another form of negation, called explicit 
negation, where default and explicitly negated literals are related by a coherence prin- 
ciple. The coherence principle can be defined by means of inference rules of the form 
-L -+ not L, one for each standard atom L E 2’. The authors define a well-founded 
semantics for extended logic programs in terms of the least extended stable model 
(WFSX model). 
Example 4.6. Let P be the extended program (taken from [56]): 
c+-a 
a+b 
b + not-b 
a1 +- 
The only extended stable model of P is N = {a-, not-a, not-c, not-c’, not-b’}. Namely, 
the coherence principle enforces the truth of the default assumption not-a, since the 
last clause of P makes a’ true. According to the transformation defined in [56], the 
first clause is deleted, and no clause for c is left, thus allowing the assumption of the 
default not-c. In our semantics, instead, P is associated with the (unique) complete 
supported model M = {a-, not-c’, not-b’}. 
The semantics defined in [56] therefore differs from our semantics, since we do not 
consider the coherence principle. One way to reconstruct the semantics presented in [56] 
is to enforce the coherence principle, and to perform a suitable program transformation 
on program clauses so as to replace each standard atom L by the pair L,not_L’ [l]. 
Example 4.7. Let us consider program P of example 4.6, and let us transform its 
clauses in order to incorporate the coherence principle (see also [5]). We obtain the 
new program Pj: 
c + a,not_a’ 
a t b,not_b’ 
b +-- not-b 
a’ + 
28 A. Broyi et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) l-59 
It is easy to observe that P and P3 have the same extended stable model, namely 
N = {a-, nota, not-c, not_c7, not-b’} 
Notice also that the complete supported model of P3 is S = {ay,not_c,not_c~, 
not-b’}, and that by enforcing coherence on S we obtain exactly the extended stable 
model N. 
Recently, Alferes et al. [lo] analyze the properties of strong and explicit negation, 
and their relation. They also analyze the relation between strong and explicit negation 
and default and classical negation, in the general context of knowledge representation 
and in terms of autoepistemic logic of beliefs. They show that any logic program P 
can be transformed into a belief theory, and that there exists a one-to-one correspon- 
dence between the stationary models of P [65] and the consistent static autoepistemic 
expansions of the corresponding belief theory [lo]. Theorem A.2 of [lo] and Theorem 
3.9 establish the correspondence between our complete models of a program P and the 
consistent static autoepistemic expansions of the belief theory obtained from P. Notice 
that, in a logic programming setting, the results presented in [lo] also show that strong 
and explicit negation coincide with the Gelfond-Lifschitz “classical” negation for (ex- 
tended) logic programs under the stable (or answer set) semantics [45]. This result ap- 
plies smoothly to our total complete models, for which both strong and explicit negation 
coincide. 
4.2.2. 3-Valued stable semantics 
Przymusinski extends in [64] the framework of 3-valued stable models to the case 
of logic programs with two kinds of negation. For normal logic programs, 3-valued 
stable models are defined through an extended Gelfond-Lifschitz’s transformation and a 
stability requirement. The framework is adapted to the case of extended logic programs 
by viewing negated literals la as new atoms a7, as we have done so far. An extended 
logic program P is then transformed into a normal logic program P’, and the 3-valued 
stable semantics of the latter is exploited to provide the former with a 3-valued stable 
semantics. 
Let M’ be a 3-valued stable model of P’. The corresponding candidate 3-valued 
model M of P is obtained as follows: 
(i) If a (resp. a’) is true in M’, then a (resp. la) is true in M; 
(ii) If a (resp. a’) is false in M’, then not a (resp. not ~a) is true in M, that is 
a (resp. la) is false by default; 
(iii) if a (resp. a’) is undefined in M’, then a (resp. la) is undefined in M. 
If the resulting set M is non-contradictory then M is a 3-valued stable model of P, it 
is discarded otherwise. 
Each complete model of P corresponds to a 3-valued stable model of P and vice- 
versa, as stated by the following proposition. 
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Proposition 4.1. Let P be an extended program. Then: M is a complete model of‘ 
P H M is a 3-valued stable model of P. 
Proof. The proof follows from the results given in Section 3 and in [6.5], and by 
viewing P as a normal logic program. 
(+) Straightforward, from Theorem 3.9 and results in [65]. Indeed (non-contradictory) 
complete pre-models correspond to the stationary expansions of P and therefore to the 
(non-contradictory) 3-valued stable models of P. 
(+) Straightforward, since the 3-valued stable models of P (when viewed as a 
normal logic program) correspond to the complete models of P. 0 
Example 4.8. Let us consider the following program P: 
a +- not-b 
b + not-a 
a‘ +- not-c 
b’ +- not-c 
{a-, b’,not_c,not_c’} is the only complete model of P, and it coincides with the 
unique 3-valued stable model of P. 
4.2.3. Answer set semantics 
Gelfond and Lifschitz present in [45] the answer set semantics as a generalization of 
the (2-valued) stable model semantics for extended programs. It is easy to show that 
the answer sets of an extended program P are stable models of the program obtained 
from P by viewing negated literals 7a as new positive atoms. Using our notation, an 
answer set of P is an interpretation S C JZ” such that S is a stable model of the normal 
logic program obtained from P by replacing each literal la with al. If S contains a 
pair of complementary literals (i.e., S is contradictory), then S is mapped into the 
whole set of standard atoms .Y’. 
In Section 3.2, we have shown that total consistent supported interpretations are 
indeed complete and that they coincide with the stable models of a normal logic 
program. In the case of extended logic programs a similar result holds. 
Proposition 4.2. Let P be an extended program. Then: 
(i) any total model M of P corresponds to an answer set of P; 
(ii) any non-contradictory answer set of P corresponds to a total model of P. 
Proof. Trivial from Proposition 4.1. 0 
Example 4.9. Let us consider the following program P: 
a +- not-b 
b +- nota 
a1 + 
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The only total model of P is {b,al,not_a,notb’}, and it coincides with the answer 
set of P. 
4.2.4. Scenario semantics with coherence principle 
Alferes et al. present in [5] a unifying framework for studying explicit negation, 
based on the notion of admissible scenarios [35] and on the coherence principle [56]. 
They introduce an “ideal skeptical semantics”, along with its well-founded semantics 
counterpart. 
The coherence principle implies that there are some mandatory hypotheses that must 
be assumed. More formally, the set of mandatory hypotheses with respect to a scenario 
PUH is 
Mand(H) = {notLIP U H U {notL + L’IL E ZW} k notL}. 
Alferes et al. consider consistent programs, where an extended logic program P is 
consistent iff P U Mand({}) IS a consistent scenario. Any consistent program has at 
least one admissible scenario. 
The ideal skeptical semantics is defined as the largest set of hypotheses H satis- 
fying the following condition “For each admissible scenario P U K: P U K U H is 
also admissible”. The well-founded semantics is defined as the grounded part of the 
ideal skeptical semantics. More precisely, the well-founded (skeptical) semantics of a 
program P is the least fixpoint of a bottom-up process, which starts with the empty 
scenario, extends it at each step with mandatory hypotheses belonging to the ideal 
skeptical scenario. Besides the skeptical semantics, Alferes et al. characterize in [S] 
more credulous semantics in terms of complete scenaria. 
While our framework does not tackle the skeptical semantics addressed in [5], we can 
briefly discuss the relations between our framework and the more credulous semantics. 
The notions of admissibility and completeness we presented can be made equivalent to 
that of [5] provided that mandatory hypotheses are added to our interpretations. More 
precisely, mandatory hypotheses may be accommodated in our framework by means 
of a suitable syntactic transformation over program clauses (as suggested for dealing 
with explicit negation). 
4.2.5. Abductive semantics 
Brewka and Konolige presented in [ 191 an abductive semantics for generalized propo- 
sitional logic programs by defining the meaning of a program in terms of its extensions. 
Default literals are modeled as abductive hypotheses, and a logic program is considered 
as the background theory. A criterion for defining the acceptable hypotheses, called ex- 
tension bases, is introduced. Their semantics applies also to programs with two kinds 
of negation, and disjunctions in clause heads. 
Given a program P and a set of hypotheses H (i.e., default literals), the P-closure 
of H is the interpretation supported by H if it is both consistent and non-contradictory. 
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Otherwise the P-closure of H is the overall Herbrand base. Given a P-closure C of a 
set of hypotheses H for a program P, the P-cover of C is then defined as 
COVp(C) = H u {nota E 2” ( a E C}. 
Then C is an extension of P if it is consistent and non-contradictory (according to 
our terminology) and there is no other set of hypotheses H’ whose P-closure C’ is 
such that COVp(C) c COF’p(C’). The set of hypotheses H supporting C is called an 
extension base of P. 
The preference criterion adopted by Brewka and Konolige models the intuition that 
undefinedness hould be minimized. From our perspective, Brewka and Konolige select 
those interpretations that are consistent and non-contradictory, and that assign a truth 
value to as many literals as possible. In this respect, their semantics is more credulous 
than ours or others semantics uch as well-founded or stationary semantics. As in our 
case, the resulting semantics is defined for any non-contradictory program. 
The semantics defined in [19] is equivalent o the stable model semantics for pro- 
grams having at least one stable model. This property can be easily accommodated in
our framework by enforcing a preference criterion for total models (if they exist) over 
partial models. 
The main drawback of the semantics in [ 191 is however that, when no stable model 
exists, it notably departs from 3-valued stable model semantics [64] and stationary 
semantics [65]. On the other hand, it solves for instance the “floating conclusion” 
problem of well-founded semantics and stationary semantics. 
Example 4.10. Consider the program P: 
a c not-b 
b +- not_a 
cca 
ccb 
The well-founded semantics does not conclude c, whereas abductive semantics is de- 
fined by two extension bases, namely {not-b} and {nota}, both of which derive c, 
being their P-closures {a, not-b, c} and {nota, b, c}, respectively. 
It is worth mentioning that Brewka in [IS] adopts the same approach but also in- 
troduces the coherence principle of Pereira and Alferes [56] thus taking into account 
explicit negation. 
4.3. Dealing with contradiction 
The introduction of a second form of negation may lead to inconsistencies in the 
models of an extended program, namely, the presence of both A and TA. There are 
several different ways of handling such inconsistencies. 
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(1) Inconsistencies may be allowed to trivialize the knowledge represented by a 
program, so that any conclusion can be derived, as for instance in the answer set 
semantics [45]. 
(2) Paraconsistent semantics can be adopted, that is, semantics allowing the deriva- 
tion of inconsistencies without trivialization (for a recent, general reference to paracon- 
sistency in Logic Programming see [29]). Intuitively speaking, paraconsistent semantics 
aim at modeling the situation in which a program contains incorrect information due to 
a human error. This approach may be employed for program diagnosis and intelligent 
debugging (e.g., see [61]). 
(3) Belief revision techniques may be employed to perform contradiction removal. 
Intuitively speaking, inconsistencies stem from assumptions which are no longer war- 
ranted rather than from erroneous information. Such assumptions are then removed 
(possibly in a minimal way) in order to restore consistency. 
As pointed out in Section 4.1, when considering two kinds of negation, the se- 
mantics based on complete pre-models may lead to contradictions. Pre-models are 
de facto paraconsistent models, and they correspond to a paraconsistent version of the 
semantics proposed by Przymusinski [64]. Non-contradictory programs have, by defi- 
nition, a supported interpretation that is always admissible and non-contradictory (viz., 
the interpretation supported by the empty set of assumables). As shown in Example 
4.3, however, there may be problems when the completeness requirement imposed on 
admissible models interferes with the non-contradictoriness requirement. 
We now discuss a contradiction removal approach to give meaning to any non- 
contradictory program. The intuition underlying the semantics with contradiction re- 
moval (see Section 4.4) is, roughly speaking: “if an assumption supports a contradic- 
tion, then take back that assumption”. In our approach, the admissibility criterion is 
taken as the basis for defining the meaning of negation by default. The completeness 
requirement can be then relaxed so as to identify as intended models of a program P 
the admissible supported interpretations that contain as many assumables as possible, 
still being consistent and non-contradictory. 
Intuitively speaking, given a contradictory complete pre-model, the idea is to with- 
draw from it as few assumables as possible, in order to restore non-contradictoriness. 
The intended models of an extended program P are then those admissible models which 
are maximal subsets of its complete pre-models. 
Definition 4.6. Let P be a non-contradictory extended program. A supported interpre- 
tation M is a contradiction-removal model of P iff it is an admissible model and is a 
maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) subset of some complete pre-model N of P. 
Example 4.11. Let P be the program: 
a + notb 
a1 +-- not-c 
P is clearly non-contradictory, but its only complete pre-model {a,a7,not_b,not_c, 
not_b’,not_c’} is contradictory. The contradiction-removal models of P are Mi = 
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{a, not& not&‘, not-c’} and M2 = {a-, not-c, not-b’, not-c-}, which are obtained by 
removing not-c and not-b, respectively. 5 
The contradiction-removal semantics is defined for any non-contradictory extended 
program, as stated by the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.3. Let P be a non-contradictory extended logic program. Then, the set 
of contradiction-removal models of P is not empty. 
Proof. Since P is non-contradictory, there is always an admissible model of P (Z(0)). 
From Proposition 3.1(i), there exists always a complete pre-model of P. For each 
complete pre-model M of P, the set of supported interpretations which are subsets of 
P and which are admissible models of P is non-empty (at least, Z(0)). 0 
Finally, it is worth observing that the set of contradiction-removal models includes 
the set of complete models. 
Proposition 4.4. Let P be a non-contradictory extended logic program. Then any 
complete model of P is a contradiction-removal model of P. 
Proof. Straightforward, since any complete model is indeed admissible and maximal. 
0 
4.4. Dealing with contradiction: related work 
The problem of removing contradiction from inconsistent programs has been ap- 
proached by many authors (e.g., [57,60,4,7-9,53,62,67]). 
In this section, we consider other approaches coping with contradiction. In order to 
give meaning to a program, two main approaches can be followed. One is contradiction 
removal, in which hypotheses are discarded (possibly in a minimal way) in order to 
restore the non-contradictoriness of a “model” despite its completeness. This is the 
basic approach we follow. 
Alternatively, contradiction avoidance can be applied by avoiding to assume an 
hypothesis (even if acceptable) if contradiction would arise when assuming it. 
In the following, we prove that our contradiction-removal semantics (Definition 4.6) 
is equivalent to complete scenario semantics introduced by Dung and Ruamviboonsuk 
in [41], even if their approach is based on contradiction avoidance rather than on 
contradiction removal. The work by Dung and Ruamviboonsuk originated from the 
argumentation view of negation in logic programming introduced in [35]. A further 
refinement (dealing with contradiction) of the argumentation approach has been defined 
in [38]. 
5 Notice that, for extended programs, it may happen that there is no least model. However, there is one 
single admissible model which is the meet of the contradiction removal models in the lower semi-lattice 
made of Contradiction Removal Models ordered by their supportive hypotheses. 
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Besides relating our work with these semantics, we will also relate our approach with 
other semantics considering explicit negation rather than pseudo negation and based on 
contradiction removal [57,60,58,4,9] or contradiction avoidance [7,8]. 
4.4.1. Argumentation semantics 
Dung shows in [39] that the most of the approaches to non-monotonic reasoning 
in artificial intelligence and logic programming can be expressed as different forms of 
argumentation. This idea is applied in [35] to develop a simple, intuitive framework 
for the semantics of normal logic programs where many proposed approached to nega- 
tion by default are unified (see Section 3.2.1). The argumentation framework is then 
extended further in [38,41] to deal with the case of extended logic programs. 
Let us first consider the work by Dung and Ruamviboonsuk [41]. In order to simplify 
the comparison, following Section 3.2.1, we restate the definitions given in [41] in 
terms of argumentation by employing the notion of attack. The semantics presented in 
[41] can be formulated by means of the notion of attack (Definition 3.6) and scenario 
(Definition 3.7), and by properly extending the notion of admissibility (see below) so 
as to take into account a second form of negation. 
Definition 4.7. Let P be an extended logic program. A scenario P U H is DR-admissible 
if and only if 
VE C Y9. E attacks H + H attacks E 
and P U H is consistent and non-contradictory. 
The definition of (D-)complete scenario (Definition 3.10) remains unchanged as in 
the case of normal logic programs. We will however talk about DR-complete scenario 
to avoid confusion. 
Definition 4.8. Let P be an extended logic program. A DR-admissible scenario P U H 
is DR-complete if and only if 
H={not_aEZ9 1 VEc:S”. E attacks {not-a} =+ H attacks E} 
Dung and Ruamviboonsuk [41] follow a contradiction avoidance approach by con- 
sidering non-admissible hypotheses whose assumption leads to a contradiction. The 
correspondence between complete scenaria and complete models, established in Sec- 
tion 3.2 for the case of normal programs, extends smoothly to the case of extended 
programs. Namely, we prove that our contradiction removal semantics is equivalent to 
the contradiction avoidance approach of [41]. To establish the equivalence between the 
contradiction-removal models of an extended program P and the DR-complete scenaria 
of P, we first introduce the following lemma. 
Lemma 4.5. Let P be an extended program and H s _I?~. Then, M(H) is an admis- 
sible model of P u P U H a DR-admissible scenario of P. 
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Proof. -c Assume P U H is a DR-admissible scenario. Then, it is also D-admissible 
according to Definition 3.8, and therefore M(H) is an admissible pre-model of P. 
Being P U H a scenario it is non-contradictory, and therefore we have that M(H) is 
an admissible model of P. 
+: Assume M(H) is an admissible model of P. Then P U H is a D-admissible 
scenario according to theorem 3.5. Being M(H) a model of P, then the scenario PUH 
is consistent and non-contradictory, and therefore we have that it is also DR-admissible. 
q 
Proposition 4.6. Let P be an extended logic program, H 2 _!Z@ and M(H) the in- 
terpretation supported by H. Then, M(H) is a contradiction-removal model of P @ 
P U H is a DR-complete scenario. 
Proof. +: Assume M(H) is a contradiction-removal model of P. We have to prove 
that 
(1) M(H) is supported + P U H is a scenario, 
(2) M(H) is an admissible model + P U H is a DR-admissible scenario, 
(3) M(H) is a maximal subset of some complete pre-model of P + P U H is a 
DR-complete scenario 
Statements (1) and (2) are trivial. The proof of (3) is given by contradiction. Assume 
that P U H is not DR-complete. Then, 3 nota E JZB such that VE C Z9. E attacks 
{not-a} + H attacks E but nota $ H and H U {not-a} is non-contradictory. Then, 
PUHU{not_a} is a DR-admissible scenario of P, and from Lemma 4.5 M’(HU{not_a}) 
is an admissible model of P. But then we get contradiction, since M(H) is not maximal. 
+: From Lemma 4.5, we have that M(H) is an admissible model of P. The rest of 
the proof is done by contradiction. Let us suppose that M(H) is not a maximal subset 
of some complete pre-model of P. Then, 3not_a E _Y9 such that M’(HU{not_a}) is an 
admissible model of P. But then we get contradiction, since the scenario PUHU{nota} 
is not DR-complete. 0 
Intuitively speaking, the equivalence between the contradiction-removal models of 
an extended program P and the DR-complete scenaria of P derives from the fact that, 
in our framework, the new condition of admissibility (Definition 4.7) is obtained by 
removing from complete pre-models the default literals introducing contradictions. 
Example 4.12. Let P be the program of Example 4.8. The contradiction-removal sup- 
ported models of P are: {a-, b’, not-c, not-c’}, {a, not-b, not-c’}, and {b, not-a, not-c’}, 
and they correspond to the DR-complete scenaria of P. 
Propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.6 allow us to relate the three semantics for extended logic 
programs that we have considered. Given an extended program P, let AS(P), 3%4(P) 
and CS(P) denote the non-contradictory answer sets [45], the 3-valued stable models 
[64] and the DR-complete scenario [41] of P, respectively. The following proposition 
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shows that DR-complete scenario semantics subsumes 3-valued stable semantics, which 
in turn subsumes answer set semantics [45]. Indeed total supported models are complete 
models of P, and complete models are in turn contradiction-removal supported models. 
Proposition 4.7. Let P be an extended logic program. Then: 
AS(P) G 3SM(P) c CS(P). 
Proof. Trivial since non-contradictory answer sets of P correspond to total models of 
P (Proposition 4.2), total models are indeed complete models, and complete models 
correspond, in turn, to 3-valued stable models (Proposition 4.1). Moreover, complete 
models are contradiction-removal models (Proposition 4.4), and they, in turn, corre- 
spond to DR-complete scenario (Proposition 4.6). 0 
In [38] Dung presents an argumentation-based semantics for extended logic programs 
where the notion of attack is further refined by distinguishing between ground attacks 
(g-attacks) and Reductio Ad Absurdum attacks @AA-attacks). Namely, the former 
notion of attack is the one presented in Section 3.2.1, while the latter is introduced for 
considering attacks caused by contradictions arising in extended logic programming. 
Definition 4.9. Let P be an extended program and let H, K C_ 2% be two sets of 
assumables supporting non-contradictory interpretations. Then we say that H RAA- 
attacks K if and only if 
M(H UK) is contradictory. 
An attack can be either a g-attack or an RAA-attack. This leads to the following 
definition of admissible set of hypotheses (scenario). 
Definition 4.10. Let P be an extended program. A scenario P U H is admissible if and 
only if 
QE C 2’“. E attacks H =S H g-attacks E 
Notice that, differently from our approach and from [41], the notion of admissibility 
does not rely on a symmetric notion of attack. Namely the attacking agent (i.e., K 
in Definition 4.10) has more arguments than the counter-attacking one (i.e., H). The 
notion of complete scenario is then introduced in the usual way (see Section 3.2.1). 
Both our semantics and the argumentation semantics of [38] have the nice property of 
being defined for any non-contradictory logic program. Our approach however defines 
a more credulous semantics, as illustrated by the following example. 
Example 4.13. For the following extended program: 
a’ t- not-q 
a +-- not-p 
b + not-r 
A. Brogi et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) 1-59 31 
{not-r} is a complete scenario but not {notr,not_q} and {not_r,not_p}. On the other 
hand, we have the contradiction-removal models: {a-, b, not_r, not-q} and {a, 6, not-r, 
not_p}. 0 
4.4.2. Contradiction and explicit negation 
In this section, we briefly review some works dealing with contradiction removal and 
contradiction avoidance semantics for explicit negation. All these works are inspired 
on the well-founded semantics [72] and on the coherence principle [56]. 
Pereira et al. [57,60,58] define a semantics that extends the WFSX semantics for 
explicit negation [56]. Roughly speaking, the key idea is to remove some contradic- 
tions and to identify the models of the program obtained by revising the Closed World 
Assumptions (CWA) supporting such contradictions. More precisely, the CWA is re- 
laxed by taking back assumptions (viz., default literals) in a minimal way by means 
of a simple syntactic transformation of the original program. The authors show that 
the proposed technique of contradiction removal is also adequate to deal with general 
kinds of contradictions, such as those arising from the violation of integrity constraints. 
The contradiction removal technique described in [57] consists of taking back a 
minimal set of default assumptions that are false under the CWA, the so-called revisable 
literals. The definition of revisable literal and the associated notion of contradiction 
removal set - the minimal set of revisable literals supporting contradiction - is further 
refined in [60,58]. 
It is worth observing that the method proposed by Pereira et al. is more selective 
than ours in taking back assumptions. Namely, they can make undefined only those 
default literals whose truth under CWA does not depend on the truth under CWA of 
other default literals. In our approach, instead, any default literal is - in principle - 
revisable. 
Example 4.14. Consider the program: 
a1 i- 
a +- not-b 
btc 
ctd 
taken from [60]. The only revisable literal is not-d, while in our approach any default 
literal can be made undefined, such as for instance not-b which depends on d. 
The semantics framework employed in [57,60] is the well-founded semantics for 
explicit negation. On the other hand, we apply contradiction removal to stable semantics 
for pseudo negation. It is worth noting that, in the absence of contradictions, the 
semantics of [60] coincides with the WFSX semantics of [56]. Similarly, when complete 
pre-models are non-contradictory, our semantics coincides with the 3-valued stable 
semantics of [64]. 
Alferes, Damasio and Pereira further generalize in [4] previous approaches to con- 
tradiction removal. They consider an extended language in order to deal with a general 
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form of integrity constraints, beyond denials of the form +- L,not_L. The revised, 
non-contradictory version of a contradictory program P is obtained from P without in- 
troducing new predicates. The original program is modified by introducing or removing 
rules for the literals that depend on no other literals. The program is partitioned into 
two parts: A subprogram that can be changed by adding rules for the revisable literals 
only, and a subprogram that is left unchanged. The revised, non-contradictory program, 
is obtained by composing these two parts. In this perspective, the program is view as 
open (see also Section 6). Moreover, while we remove contradiction by modifying 
the truth value of literals into undefined only, in [4] the truth value can be changed 
from any value into any other value. The contradiction removal approach proposed in 
[4] is therefore more general than ours, and suggests an alternative way of removing 
contradiction in our framework. Namely, we can view programs as open as well, and 
add a variable part to each program so as to change the truth value of revisable literals 
to any value (not only to unknown, as in the original approach). More precisely, the 
truth value of a literal L (resp., ‘L) can be changed to true by adding the rule L t 
(resp. TL c), and to unknown by adding the rule L c not-L (resp. TL +- not_lL). 
Then, as in [4], the revised program is obtained by composing the fixed and variable 
components. Notice also that, thanks to the compositionality properties of our approach 
(see Section 6), the supported interpretations of each composition of programs can be 
directly obtained by the supported interpretations of the separate sub-programs. 
Example 4.15. Consider again program P of Example 4.11: 
a c not-b 
a’ + not-c 
The complete pre-model of P 
1 a, a-, notb, not-c, not-b’, not-c’} 
is contradictory. The contradiction-removal models of P are 
Mi = {a, not-b, not-b’, not-c’} 
A42 = {a-, not-c, not-b’, not-c’} 
which are obtained by building two revisions of P, one obtained by adding as variable 
part the program RI: 
c + not-c 
and the other obtained by adding as variable part the program R2: 
b + not-b 
The contradiction-removal model Mi turns out to be a complete model of P U RI, and 
A& the complete model of P U R2. 
Alferes and Pereira propose in [7] a contradiction avoidance semantics defined in 
terms of optative hypotheses. In particular they extend the argumentation framework 
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defined in [5] where complete scenaria semantics is defined for extended logic programs 
with negation by default and explicit negation. A program may have no complete sce- 
nario, even if it is non-contradictory. Alferes and Pereira in [7] allow the programmer 
to specify which hypotheses used to build scenaria are optative. Optative hypotheses 
can be accepted or not, and a scenario might not be complete with respect to the 
optatives. Namely scenaria may be partially complete, that is, complete with respect to 
non-optatives, but possibly not complete with respect to optatives. The equivalence be- 
tween contradiction avoidance as defined in [7] and the contradiction removal approach 
of [9] has been proved in [8,9]. 
4.4.3. Other approaches 
The problem of removing contradiction from inconsistent programs has been ap- 
proached by many other authors (e.g., [53,62,67]). 
In [62] Pimentel and Rodi address the issue of belief revision in terms of stable 
revisions. A stable revision is a minimal modification of a stable model constructed 
so as to eliminate inconsistencies through the retraction of assumptions. The authors 
consider the language of symmetric logic programs, including a modal operator A4 and 
a form of negation 7, and show that this language can be easily mapped into the 
language of extended logic programs. Their approach is very similar to ours. They do 
not trivialize inconsistent answer sets of the program, but rather remove inconsistencies 
by minimally changing the assumptions of the program corresponding to default literals. 
They also present an implementation of the technique through a Truth Maintenance 
System [34]. 
In [67] Sakama extends the well-founded semantics to the case of paraconsistent 
logic programs. Contradiction is addressed by identifying suspicious facts, that is, facts 
whose proofs include some inconsistent information. Moreover, facts supported by sus- 
picious facts are suspicious as well. In our approach only default literals are considered 
as suspicious, and therefore possibly retracted (together with their conclusions). This 
explains why we do not provide a solution, for instance, to the program {p, up, q} 
like [41], while Sakama is able to retract one of the two facts (i.e., p and up) leading 
to contradiction. 
5. Abduction 
In this section, we move to the final extension of the basic language and consider 
the case of logic programs with negation by default, explicit negation, and abduction 
with integrity constraints, referred to as abductive logic programs. In this way, we 
define a model-theoretic semantics for abduction in a logic programming setting (see 
Section 5.2). A correct proof procedure for this wider class of programs is given in 
Section 7. 
Abduction has been recognized as a powerful mechanism for hypothetical reasoning 
in the presence of incomplete knowledge [27,28,25,42,48]. 
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Though abduction has been the focus of intensive research, many questions concern- 
ing both declarative and operational semantics of abduction still arise. Given a theory T 
and a formula G, the goal of abduction is to find a set of atoms A which together with 
T entails G, that is T U A k G. Operationally, G is derivable in T with “conditional 
answer” A. 
In this section, we focus on abductive logic program, that is extended programs where 
some predicate symbols are identified as abducibles and have no definitions in the 
program. An abducible predicate represents a further source of incomplete information, 
other than negation by default. 
5.1. Preliminaries 
As in the previous sections, we will directly refer to the positive version of abductive 
logic programs. An abductive logic program is a triple (P,Ab,lC) where 
(i) P is an extended logic program (as in Section 4); 
(ii) Ab is a set of abducible atoms, such that for each a E Ab, only a and not-a 
may occur in P and IC, and a never occurs in the head of any clause of P; 
(iii) IC is a set of integrity constraints, that is, a set of denials of the form t 
II,..., n, I n>l. 
It is worth noting that, by condition (ii) above, we do not consider the explicit 
negation of an abducible atom a’, but only its negation by default. This is justified 
by the observation that an abducible a is itself a default hypothesis, and it makes no 
sense assuming the explicit negation of an hypothesis, since such a negation would 
be anyway a default assumption, To keep the distinction between abducibles and non- 
abducibles clear, in the sequel we will refer to _Y+ as the set of atoms a $ Ab such 
that either a, or nota, or a’, or not-a’ occurs in P. Moreover, the other symbols 
occurring in (P, Ab, IC) will be partitioned into the following sets: 
_Y7 = {a’ 1 a E 9’) F=z+ u 9’ Z&=Ab 
Y3 = {not-l 1 I E 9’ U _Yd}. 
To point out their intuitive meaning, atoms in _P, 5?‘, .2@, LF9, and _.Y& will be 
referred to as positive, negated, standard, default and abducibles literals, respectively. 
The whole Herbrand base 93 of an abductive logic program is then 
Given a Herbrand interpretation Z 2 28 we will denote by 1.“4 the set of abducibles in 
Z 7 that is I& =In_Y&. 
5.2. Model theory 
In order to assign a semantics to an abductive logic program (P,Ab, IC) we build 
upon the model theory for extended logic programs defined in Section 4. We keep 
following an abductive interpretation of negation by default, which means that also in 
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this case the set of assumables contains the set of default atoms 9”. However, the 
assumables are now extended to contain also the set of abducible literals _Y’&, due to 
their inherent nature of assumables. The whole set of assumables Y? we use in this 
case is then 
Admissible supported interpretations are still characterized through the notion of 
conservative extensions, as in Definition 3.3. Let us rephrase here that definition in the 
case of abductive logic programs. 
Definition 5.1. Let (P,Ab,ZC) be an abductive logic program and let I(H),J(K) & 98 
be two supported interpretations. Then, J(K) is a conservative extension of I(H) if 
and only if K>H and EnI = 0. 
Remark 5.1. Given an abductive logic program (P,Ab,ZC), a conservative extension 
J(K) of a supported interpretation I(H) is such that 
(i) for any standard atom I E 2”, if not-l E K then 1 @’ I, and 
(ii) for any abducible a E Ab, if a E K (resp. nota E K) then nota 9 H (resp. 
a$H). 
Notice that (ii) above follows from the fact that abducibles have no definitions in 
P, and hence an abducible a or not-a belongs to a supported interpretation Z(H) if 
and only if it belongs to the set of assumables H. This allows us to keep the same 
notion of admissible interpretations of Definition 3.4 also in the case of abductive logic 
programs. 
Definition 5.2. Let (P,Ab,IC) be an abductive logic program. A supported interpre- 
tation I(H) is admissible if and only if for any conservative extension J(K) of I, 
HnJ=P). 
Notice that this definition is analogous to Definition 3.4. However, due to Remark 
5.1 (ii), the admissibility of a supported interpretation I(H) depends only on the fact 
that any conservative extension of it is consistent with the set of default hypotheses in 
H, that is with the set H f7 Yg. 
As in the case of extended logic programs, we will not assign any abductive logic 
program a semantics, due to the fact that an abductive logic program may be inher- 
ently contradictory (notice that an extended logic program P can always be seen as 
the abductive logic program (P,0,0)). H owever, the notion of non-contradictoriness 
of an interpretation, and consequently of an abductive logic program (P, Ab,ZC) , has 
now to take into account also the set of integrity constraints. The role of the integrity 
constraints ZC is in fact to rule out interpretations which do not satisfy them. This is ob- 
tained by extending the notion of non-contradictoriness of an interpretation (Definition 
2.3 (ii)) as follows. 
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Definition 5.3. Let (P,Ab,IC) be an abductive logic program and I & 99 be an inter- 
pretation. Then I is non-contradictory if and only if I k IC’ and I + IC. 
We can now naturally extend Definition 4.4 to abductive logic programs as follows. 
Definition 5.4. An abductive logic program (P, Ab, IC) is non-contradictory if and only 
if the supported interpretation I(0) is non-contradictory. 
From now onwards we will consider only non-contradictory abductive logic pro- 
grams, which are assigned a semantics by extending in a natural way the definition of 
admissible pre-models and complete pre-models of Section 4. 
Definition 5.5. Let (P, Ab, IC) be a non-contradictory, abductive program. A supported 
interpretation Z(H) is an admissible pre-model of (P, Ab, IC) if and only if it is admis- 
sible and consistent. 
Also in this case, we use the term pre-model instead of model since admissibil- 
ity and consistency of a supported interpretation are not sufficient to ensure non- 
contradictoriness. Similarly, we can extend Definition 4.2 as follows. 
Definition 5.6. Let (P, Ab, ZC) be a non-contradictory, abductive program. An admissi- 
ble pre-model I(H) is a complete pre-model of P if and only if the following property 
holds: 
(Vl E _Y’ U .S?.(not_Z E H M (VJ E GE(I) : I # .I))). 
As in the case of extended programs, complete pre-models are promising approx- 
imations of the intended models for non-contradictory abductive programs. However, 
non-contradictoriness of complete pre-models with respect o the set of integrity con- 
straints IC U IC’ is not always guaranteed. Nevertheless, we can take here the same 
approach we have followed for extended logic programs, characterizing the intended 
models of an abductive logic program as follows. 
Definition 5.7. Let (P, Ab, ZC) be a non-contradictory abductive program. A supported 
interpretation M is an abductive model of (P,Ab,IC) iff it is an admissible model and 
is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) subset of some complete pre-model N of (P,Ab,ZC) . 
By definition, any abductive model of (P, Ab,ZC) is indeed an admissible model. 
The abductive semantics is defined for any non-contradictory abductive logic pro- 
gram, as stated by following proposition. 
Proposition 5.1. Let (P, Ab, IC) be a non-contradictory abductive logic program. Then, 
the set of abductive models of (P,Ab,ZC) is not empty. 
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Proof. Being P non-contradictory, we have that there always exists an admissible pre- 
model of P (I(0)) which is non-contradictory. From Proposition 3.1(i), there always 
exists a complete pre-model of P. 
For each complete pre-model A4 of P, the set of supported interpretations which are 
subsets of P and which are admissible models of P is non empty (at least, 1(8) is the 
single element). Cl 
The abductive semantics embeds the generalized stable model semantics by Kakas 
and Mancarella [48]. In particular, the following proposition holds. 
Proposition 5.2. Let (P, Ab, IC) be an abductive logic program. Then, any generalized 
stable model of (P, Ab,IC) corresponds to an abductive model. 
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that generalized stable models are total, and 
total models are indeed complete (see Proposition 3.l(ii)) and therefore they are also 
abductive models. 0 
The semantics introduced in Section 3 for negation by default and in section 4 for 
explicit negation can be obtained irectly as instances of the abductive framework here 
presented. 
A related approach is that by Damasio and Pereira in [30]. Our basic semantics is 
inspired on 3-valued stable semantics [64] while their approach is inspired on well- 
founded semantics [72] plus the coherence principle. The framework in [30] is an 
abductive one defined by a triple (P, A,Z), where P is the program (possibly extended 
with a variable part), A the set of abducibles, and I integrity constraints. They allow 
general integrity constraints to be part of the program, and add further constraints to 
detect paraconsistency. Consistency (viz. non-contradictoriness in our terminology) is 
regained by revising the truth value of the revisables that lend to violation of integrity 
constraints. Various semantics are recovered by relaxing the coherence principle, and 
possibly varying both the set of abducibles and the set of constraints. In particular, 
they relate their framework with various abductive and 3-valued semantics for extended 
logic programs, such as Generalized Stable Models [48], Stable Models [44], Stationary 
Models [65], Well-Founded Semantics [72]. 
In our framework contradiction is always removed by changing the truth value of 
abducibles into undefined only and constraints are denials only (as in [8,57]). In 
[30], instead, Damasio and Pereira allow revision by introducing or removing rules, 
thus they can also change the truth value of a literal from undefined to true or 
false. 
Not surprisingly, our approach and that in [30] coincide when abducibles are default 
literals only, and totality constraints are added to the program (and thus the WFSX 
model is total). In this case, both WFSX model and our (unique) complete model 
coincides with the unique stable model of the program (the coherence principle being 
always satisfied, in this case). When also arbitrary literals, besides default literals, are 
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considered as abducibles, the semantics of [30] also recovers (as our semantics does) 
the Generalized Stable Model semantics. 
6. Compositional semantics for extended logic programs 
This section is devoted to discuss the issue of defining compositional semantics for 
extended logic programs. We will show that the model-theoretic semantics based on 
supported interpretations allows us to obtain compositionality results for all the various 
semantics that have been considered in this paper. 
6.1. Cornpositionality 
The property of compositionality plays a major role in the study of the semantics of 
programming languages. Simply stated, a semantics is compositional (or homomorphic) 
if the meaning of a program can be obtained from the meaning of its components (see, 
for instance, [22,17]). 
The definition of a compositional semantics for a programming language induces 
interesting results on the equivalence of programs (or program parts) which are at the 
basis of most, if not all, operations on programs (or program parts). 
Indeed each method of giving a semantics to a programming language induces an 
equivalence relation on programs. Namely, two programs are equivalent if and only if 
they have the same meaning in the chosen semantics. If a semantics is compositional 
with respect to some composition operations then the induced equivalence relation is 
a congruence for those operations. 
This property establishes, for instance, a firm foundation for reasoning about pro- 
grams and program transformations. Suppose that a program P consists of two parts, 
Q and R say, suitably composed together. Suppose also that R’ is, for instance, a more 
efficient version of R, obtained by applying some program transformation technique to 
R. Now if R’ is equivalent to R in the chosen semantics then the property of compo- 
sitionality ensures that the substitution of R’ for R does not affect the meaning of the 
whole program P. 
Let us now consider the case of extended logic programs. First of all, generally 
speaking, it is by no means clear when two programs should be considered equivalent. 
Indeed there is no general agreement on what the meaning of an extended logic program 
should be, as testified by the number of alternative proposals. Moreover, the existing 
semantics for extended logic programs do not address compositional&y issues. In other 
words, it is not clear how to determine the models of a program from the models of 
its components. 
Example 6.1. Let us consider the case of logic programs with negation as default. It 
is easy to show, for instance, that the stable model semantics proposed by Gelfond and 
Lifschitz [44] is not compositional with respect to the union of programs. Consider 
for instance the two programs a +- and a c not b which have the same (unique) 
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stable model {u}. If these programs are extended with the clause b c we obtain two 
programs which have different stable models ({a, b} and {b}, respectively). Therefore 
it is not possible, in general, to determine the stable models of a program from the 
stable models of its clauses. 
6.2. Establishing compositionality 
We now show how the model-theoretic semantics which has been presented in this 
paper can be used to define a compositional semantics for the whole class of extended 
logic programs. 
In Sections 3-5 we have considered three extensions of logic programming: nega- 
tion by default, pseudonegation and abduction. For each of these extensions, several 
alternative semantics have been proposed in the literature. 
Each semantics can be represented by a mapping, Y, associating a meaning, Y(P) 
- e.g. a set of models - to a program P. Suppose now that the equivalence relation 
induced by a semantics 9’ is not compositional with respect to the union of programs. 
Namely this means that there are three programs PI, Pz and Q such that 
W’I I= ~W’z) A Y(Pl u Q> # 9V2 u Q>. 
(Example 6.1 illustrates such a situation in the case of stable models.) 
Our objective is then to define a compositional semantics that preserves such an 
intended meaning Y of programs. A standard approach consists of considering a more 
distinguishing semantics V which preserves the semantics Y and which is a congruence 
for the set of compositions considered. 
In the case of extended logic programs, for a given semantics 9, this corresponds 
to finding a semantics V such that 
l V is a congruence for the operation of union of programs. 
Formally, VP, Q, R : S’(P) = W(Q) G- U(P U R) = W(Q U R). 
0 % preserves Y. 
That is, VP, Q : U(P) = g(Q) + Y(P) = 9’(Q). 
Such a compositional semantics k? would allow one to reason about programs and 
program compositions. For instance, suppose that a program P consists of two parts, 
Q and R say, that is P = Q U R. The compositionality result allows one to replace, for 
instance, R with any program R’ having the same semantics ‘8 without affecting the 
meaning Y(P) of the overall program. Indeed if g(R) = V(R’) then by definition of 
congruence we have that g(Q U R) = %(Q U R’). Since +?Z preserves Sp we also have 
that 9’(Q U R) = Y(Q U R’). 
In the rest of this section, we will show that there exists a semantics % for extended 
logic programs which is compositional with respect to the union of programs, and which 
preserves any meaning Y for extended logic programs that has been considered in this 
paper. More precisely, we will show that such a semantics Y coincides with the well- 
known logical equivalence on the positive versions of extended logic programs. We 
will first recall the compositionality of logical equivalence with respect to the union of 
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(definite) logic programs which has been established, for instance, in [54,24,23]. Then 
we will show how the results presented in this paper imply that logical equivalence on 
the positive versions of programs preserves the various meanings for extended logic 
programs which have been previously discussed. 
In order to study the property of compositionality for extended logic programs, it 
is necessary to first fix some suitable notions that are needed for a multi-program 
setting. When considering a multi-program setting, we assume that the language in 
which programs are written is fixed. Namely, let V be a global vocabulary which 
contains the set of predicate, function and constant symbols from which the various 
programs are constructed. Put another way, the Herbrand base of a collection of pro- 
grams is determined by a set of predicate, function and constant symbols that includes 
all function and predicate symbols used in the programs. The definition of positive 
version of a program, given in Section 2, is therefore extended to take into account 
the global vocabulary with which programs are written. Namely, rather than denoting 
by 9; the set of all ground atoms a such that either a, or not a, or -a, or not la 
occurs in P we have the following more general definition. We denote by _Y+ the 
set of atomic formulae constructed by using predicate, function and constant symbols 
in V. 
6.2. I. Logical equivalence 
The semantics for extended logic programs that has been presented in this paper is 
based on the notion of supported interpretation, which has been introduced in Section 
2.2. Intuitively speaking, the idea is to consider a set of assumables hypotheses 2. 
Then we say that an interpretation I for a program P is supported by a set of hypotheses 
H, where H C X, if I is the least Herbrand model of the program PUH. The definition 
of supported interpretation has been then employed in Sections 3-5 to model logic 
programs with negation by default, pseudo negation and abduction, respectively. In 
each case, the notion of supported interpretation has been extended by considering 
different sets of assumable hypotheses, namely: 
l The set of default atoms in the case of negation by default and in the case of pseudo 
negation (2 = LZ9)), and 
l The set of default atoms and the set of abducible literals in the case of abduction 
(X = 99 u .9&). 
As already observed in Section 2.2, if the set of assumables coincides with the whole 
Herbrand base (Z’ = 99) then the notion of supported interpretation coincides with the 
notion of Herbrand model for definite programs. Indeed, an interpretation A4 is a model 
for a program if and only if M is supported by some interpretation. 
Lemma 6.1. Let P be a dejinite programs and let M C 99. 
MbP ti IH:HCBAM=lhm(PUH). 
where Ihm stands for least Herbrand model. 
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Proof. (+): Let H = M. Then: 
Ihm(P u H) 
{ definition of least Herbrand model } 
min{Z~Z~PuH} 
{ lemma 6.2 below } 
rnin{l~Z~P~Z~H} 
= { definition of H } M 
(+): Trivial. q 
The equivalence relation induced by the Herbrand model semantics is the well-known 
logical equivalence. That is, two definite programs are logically equivalent if and only 
if they have the same Herbrand models. Let E HM denote logical equivalence, i.e., 
P -_H_&, Q % HM(P) = HM(Q), 
where HM(P) denotes the set of Herbrand models of a definite program P. Let now 3~1 
denote the equivalence relation induced by the supported interpretations of a program, 
i.e., 
P =SI Q + SZ(P) = SZ(Q), 
where SZ(P) denotes the set of supported interpretations for a definite program P: 
SZ(P)={Z(H)IZCB A H&S’? A Z=Zhm(PuH)}. 
By virtue of Lemma 6.1, it is easy to observe that logical equivalence preserves the 
equivalence relation E_SI for any choice of the set of assumables SC g’, i.e., 
Moreover, as shown for instance in [54,24,23], logical equivalence is compositional 
with respect to the operation of union of programs. Indeed the Herbrand models of 
the union of two programs can be determined by the Herbrand models of the separate 
programs as shown by the following lemma. 
Lemma 6.2. Let P and Q be de$nite programs and let M G 93. 
MFPUQ * M)=PAM+Qe. 
Proof. (=s): Immediate. 
(+): Suppose that M F P U Q. Then, by definition of Herbrand model, ZlA c 
B E ground(P U Q) such that B GM A A $! M. Suppose that such a clause belongs to 
ground(P) (the other case is analogous). Then by definition of Herbrand model M is 
not a model for P. Contradiction. 0 
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6.2.2. Relations with other semantics 
We now conclude our discussion by showing how logical equivalence on (the pos- 
itive version of) programs actually preserves the equivalence relations induced by 
all the semantics for extended logic programs which have been considered in this 
paper. 
In Sections 3-5 we have considered three main extensions of logic programming: 
Negation by default, pseudo negation and abduction. In each case we have proposed a 
model-theoretic semantics whose definition consists of three steps: 
(1) Given an extended logic program, construct its positive version; 
(2) Consider the set of supported interpretations of (the positive version of) the pro- 
gram; 
(3) Select among the supported interpretations those models which characterize the 
intended meaning of a program. 
We have also shown the existing correspondence between these models and the 
models proposed by other authors. For instance, in Section 3.2, we have shown the 
correspondence between our complete models and: 
l the complete scenario of Dung [35], 
l the stationary expansions of Przymusinski [65], 
l the stable models of Gelfond and Lifschitz [44], and 
l the well-founded semantics of Van Gelder, Ross, and Schlipf [72]. 
These correspondences can be equivalently described in the following way. For each 
semantics Y considered, there exists a suitable projection function I+$ which, given 
the set of supported interpretations SI(P) of (the positive version of) a program P, 
yields the models Y(P) of the corresponding semantics Y: 
+y : S(P) + Y(P). 
In terms of program equivalence, this means that the supported interpretations se- 
mantics preserves all the semantics which have been considered in this paper. Indeed 
for any such semantics 9’: 
P =sI Q + P Z-Y Q. 
By combining the latter observation with the observation that logical equivalence pre- 
serves the equivalence relation induced by the supported interpretations of a program, 
we have the following result. 
Proposition 6.3. Let P and Q be two extended logic programs. If the positive versions 
of P and Q are logically equivalent, then the two programs have the same meaning 
Y for each Y considered in the paper. 
Proof. Trivial. q 
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Consider for instance two logic programs with negation by default. If (the positive 
versions of) the two programs are logically equivalent then the programs have the same 
D-complete scenaria [35], the same stationary expansions [65], the same stable models 
[44], and so on. 
The compositionality of logical equivalence suggests its use for reasoning about 
extended logic programs. For instance, suppose that a program P consists of two parts, 
Q and R say, that is P = Q U R. The we can replace R with any program R’ such 
that the positive versions of R and R’ are logically equivalent. Indeed, thanks to the 
compositionality of logical equivalence, we have that the resulting programs have the 
same meaning, that is P’(Q U R) = Y(Q U R’) for any meaning Y which has been 
considered in this paper. 
The application of these results to analyze program transformation techniques, for 
extended logic programs is scope for future work (see also [ 111). 
7. Proof procedure 
In this section, we present a top-down proof procedure which is correct for the 
semantics discussed in Sections 3-5. In the following we rely upon the terminology 
introduced in Section 5 since the abductive semantics defined in that section includes 
those defined for normal 3 and extended logic programs 4. 
The method here described is not effective, and has to be rather considered an abstract 
interpreter. Therefore, we do not address the problems of loops and termination which 
are fundamental, instead, having in mind a real implementation. 
The proof procedure here presented is grounded on that defined by Kakas and Man- 
carella [49]. The starting point is to consider an abductive logic program as a posi- 
tive program (as shown in Section 2) provided that integrity constraints of the kind 
{c I, not_llVZ E Z@} and { + a,~]Va E P’+} are added to ZC. 
The procedure in [49] extended Eshghi and Kowalski’s procedure [42] in order to 
manipulate arbitrarily abducibles. It deals with ground abductive logic programs, and 
manipulates a class of integrity constraints which are denials containing at least one 
abducible or default atom in each integrity constraint. Therefore, we assume the same 
hypotheses. 
We accommodate this procedure for our framework by 
Lifting it to the 3-valued case. In particular, we do not consider integrity constraints 
of the kind a V not-u, imposed instead in [49]. In this way we remove the totality 
requirement. 6 
Dealing with explicit negation, not considered in [49]. Each negated literal YU is 
viewed as a new positive atom, and the integrity constraint t a, la added to the 
program. 
6 This kind of constraint is enforced in [49], but not used in the procedure. In fact, non-contradictoriness 
checking only checks integrity constraints which are denials. 
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Notice that this latter integrity constraint does not satisfy the requirement of having 
at least one abducible or default atom. However, through the application of unfolding 
on standard atoms we can possibly reduce to this case7 
Example 7.1. Let us consider the following program: 
a +- not-b 
a1 + not-b 
The added integrity constraint +- a, Ta is transformed, through unfolding in the fol- 
lowing, equivalent one: +- not-b. 
7.1. The basic algorithm 
In the following, we recall the main steps of the procedure, which is in practice that 
defined in [49]. 
Abductive derivation: An abductive derivation from (Gi Al) to (G,, A,,) in (P, Ab,ZC) 
via a selection rule R is a sequence 
(G Al),(G Az),...,(G An) 
such that each Gi has the form + Li,. ..,Lk, R(Gi) = Lj and (Gi+i Ai+l) is obtained 
according to one of the following rules: 
(1) If Lj is not abducible or default, then Gi+i = C and Ai+l = Ai where C is the 
resolvent of some clause in P with Gi on the selected literal Lj; 
(2) If Lj is abducible or default and Lj E Ai then Gi+i =+ L1, . . . , Lj_l,Lj+l, . . . ,Lk 
and Ai+, = Ai; 
(3) If Lj is abducible or default, Lj @ Ai and q @ Ai and there exists a consistency 
derivation from ({Lj} Ai U {Lj}) to ({} A’) then Gi+i =+ Ll,...,Lj-l,Lj+l,,Lk 
and Ai+l = A’. 
Steps (1) and (2) are SLD-resolution steps with the rules of P and abductive or 
default hypotheses, respectively. In step (3) a new abductive or default hypotheses is 
required and it is added to the current set of hypotheses provided it is non-contradictory. 
Consistency derivation: A consistency derivation for an abducible or default literal 
CI from (CI Al) to (F, A,) in (P,Ab,ZC) is a sequence 
where (i) Fi is the union of all goals of the form + L1, . . . , L, obtained by resolving 
the abducible or default M with the denials in IC with no such goal been empty, +-; 
(ii) for each i > 1, Fi has the form {+Lr,...,Lk}uF: and for somej= l,...,k 
(Fi+l Ai+l) is obtained according to one of the following rules: 
‘Another solution would be that proposed in [68], where forward evaluation of rules is adopted in order 
to check any form of integrity constraints. A proof procedure for the abductive semantics dealing with a 
broader class of integrity constraints but based on forward evaluation of rules is reported in [70]. 
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(Cl ) If Lj is not abducible or default, then Fi+i = C’ U I$’ where C’ is the set 
of all resolvents of clauses in P with +- L1, . . . , Lk on the literal Lj and t@ C’, and 
dj+i = di; 
(C2) If Lj is abducible or default, Lj E Ai and k > 1, then 
Fi+i ={tL1,...,Li_*,Lj+l,...,Lk}U.Fi and d;+l =di; 
(C3) If Li is abducible or default, G E di then Fi+i = F; and Ai+] = di; 
(C4) If Li is abducible or default, Lj # Ai and q 6 dj, and there exists an abductiue 
derioation from (c G di) to (+- A’) then Fit-i = E;i’ and di+i = A’. 
In case (Cl ) the current branch splits into as many branches as the number of resol- 
vents of +- L1 , . . . ,Lk with the clauses in P on Lj. If the empty clause is one of such 
resolvents the whole consistency check fails. In case (C2) the goal under consideration 
is made simpler if literal Lj belongs to the current set of hypotheses dj. In case (C3) 
the current branch is already non-contradictory under the assumptions in dj, and this 
branch is dropped from the consistency checking. In case (C4) the current branch of 
the consistency search space can be dropped provided + q is abductively provable. 
Given a query L (atomic, for the sake of simplicity), the procedure succeeds, and 
returns the set of abducibles A if there exists an abductive derivation from (+- L{ }) 
to (t A). 
Example 7.2. For the program of Example 7.1 the algorithm would produce no abduc- 
tive explanation for a since there not exists any consistency derivation for the default 
literal notb. If no unfolding is performed on integrity constraints, the algorithm would 
produce, instead, {not-b} as an abductive explanation for a, and this explanation is 
clearly not right. 
In [49], Kakas and Mancarella have stated the soundness of this procedure with 
respect o generalized stable model semantics when the program P is call-consistent. 
Theorem 7.1 (Kakas and Mancarella [49]). Let (P,Ab,IC) be an abductive logic pro- 
gram where P is call-consistent and a literal L an observation. If (t L( }) has an 
abductiue derivation to ( e A), then the subset A’ G A such that A’ = A f~ 2-“’ is an 
abductive explanation of L. 
A literal L has an abductive xplanation A c SF d if and only if there exists a (gen- 
eralized) stable model M of P U A such that L E M and M /= IC [49]. 
However, the following example shows the unsoundness of this procedure ven for 
call-consistent programs. 
Example 7.3. Let us consider the following (call-consistent) abductive program, 
where P 
at 
btc 
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Ab = {c} and ZC = {t not) U { t c}. There exists an abductive derivation from 
(+ a{ 1) to (+- {]), b u no generalized stable models exists. In fact, the only com- t 
plete total interpretations, {a,not-b,not_c} and {a,b,c}, do not satisfy the integrity 
constraints. Our semantics, instead, gives meaning to this program in terms of the 
abductive model {a}. 
The correctness of the proof procedure with respect to our abductive semantics is 
established by Theorem 7.3 and Theorem 7.4, stating, respectively, the soundness and 
completeness results. 
In order to prove these theorems, we use the following lemma which is an extension 
of Lemma A4 in [35]. 
Lemma 7.2. Let us consider a non-contradictory abductive logic program (P,Ab,ZC), 
and let L E 2” be a standard atom. 
(i) Assume there exists an abductive derivation from (t L{ }) to (c A). Then, 
the supported interpretation Z(A) of (P,Ab,ZC) is non-contradictory. 
(ii) Assume there exists a non-contradictory supported interpretation of (P,Ab,ZC), 
Z(H), such that L E Z(H). Suppose that every selection of rules in the proof proce- 
dure for L terminates with either success or failure. Then, there exists an abductive 
derivation from (t L {}) to (t A) such that A C_ H. 
Theorem 7.3 (Soundness). Let us consider a non-contradictory abductive logic 
program. Let L be a standard atom. Zf there exists an abductive derivation from 
(+ L{ }) to (+- A) then there exists an abductive model M such that L E M and 
AcMduM9. 
Proof (sketch). From Lemma 7.2(i), Z(A) is non-contradictory. From Proposition A in 
[35] and Theorem 3.5, we also have that Z(A) is admissible. Therefore, from Definition 
5.7, there exists an abductive model M such that Z(A) GM. 0 
Theorem 7.4 (Weak completeness). Let us consider an abductive logic program. Let 
L be a standard atom. Suppose that every selection of rules in the proof procedure 
for L terminates with either success or failure. Zf there exists an abductive model 
M such that L E M, then there exists a selection of rules such that the procedure 
succeeds for L returning A, where A GM” U M9. 
Proof (sketch). Straightforward from Lemma 7.2 (ii) since any abductive model is 
non-contradictory by definition. 0 
Therefore, the procedure here defined is sound with respect to the abductive seman- 
tics, and it is complete when no predicate in the program depends on itself, i.e., the 
program contains no loop. 
From Theorem 7.4, we obtain the following corollary for finite failure. 
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Corollary 7.5. Let us consider an abductive logic program. Let L be a standard 
atom. If the procedure jinitely fails for L then no abductive model M exists such that 
LEM. 
From this corollary directly follows that we can use finite failure to check if a literal 
L is unknown in all abductive models, since the finite failure of the procedure for both 
L and 1 means that every abductive model does not contain either L or E. 
7.2. Related work 
Eshghi and Kowalski [42] firstly introduced a top-down proof procedure (further 
refined in [35]) to compute negation as failure through abduction which is sound 
with respect o admissible scenaria [35]. When considering normal logic programs, the 
procedure here presented becomes, in practice, the abductive proof procedure by Eshghi 
and Kowalski. Therefore, Theorem 7.4 states a weak completeness result, in the case 
of finite failure, for admissible scenarios. 
In the following, we mainly focus on proof procedures for abductive or extended 
logic programs. Thus, we do not consider procedures defined for normal ogic programs 
(see [14] for a survey). 
In Proposition 4.7, we have shown that, for extended logic programs, our seman- 
tics embeds the 3-valued stable semantics which, in turns, subsumes the answer set 
semantics. Therefore, our proof procedure is weakly complete (under the conditions of 
Theorem 7.4) with respect o the answer set semantics for extended logic programs, 
but of course not sound. In fact, the totality requirement of answer set semantics is 
not enforced in our procedure. 
To provide a query evaluation method for abduction, Kakas and Mancarella [49] 
extended Eshghi and Kowalski’s procedure to manipulate arbitrarily abducibles. The 
procedure in [49] is top-down and maintains the backward evaluation of integrity 
constraints as [42]. Satoh and Iwayama [68] pointed out that this proof procedure is 
unsound with respect o generalized stable model semantics, and presented anew query- 
based procedure which can be regarded as an improvement of Kakas and Mancarella’s 
one, and is correct with respect o Generalized Stable Model semantics. This is obtained 
at the expense of a more complex integrity checking involving forward evaluation of 
rules for handling (general) integrity constraints and implicit deletion of rules [66]. 
As pointed out in Section 7, the procedure by Kakas and Mancarella [49] is correct 
with respect to our abductive semantics. Neither checking for implicit deletion nor 
forward evaluation of rules is therefore needed to equip our semantics with a correct, 
query-based proof procedure. 
A proof procedure for our abductive framework could be also obtained from that 
defined by Satoh and Iwayama [68]. The extension would concern the check for implicit 
deletion of rules. There exists, in fact, an intimate bond between implicit deletion 
checking and the totality requirement of (2-valued) stable semantics. The check for 
implicit deletion in [68] actually verifies that the model under consideration gives an 
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absolute truth value (true or false) to each atom. Since abductive models are not 
required to be total, removing the check for implicit deletion from the procedure in 
[68] ensures a correct behavior with respect o our abductive semantics (see [70] for 
details). 
In [71], Teusink presents a proof procedure for extended logic programs correct with 
respect o a proof-theoretic semantics. As pointed out by the author, the implemented 
semantics does not always give the intuitive expected results. This semantics does not 
guarantee the global non-contradictoriness (which is, instead, guaranteed in our proof 
procedure) since considered too complex to be tested, but only some form of local 
non-contradictoriness. 
In [31], Denecker and De Schreye introduce a proof procedure for normal abductive 
logic programs by extending the SLDNF resolution to the case of abduction. The re- 
sulting proof procedure (SLDNFA) is correct with respect o the completion semantics. 
A crucial property of this abductive procedure is the treatment of non-ground abduc- 
tive goals not considered, instead, in our procedure limited to the ground case. In [31], 
the authors do not consider general integrity constraints, but only constraints of the 
kind t a,nota. To overcome this limitation, in a later work [32], they consider the 
treatment of general integrity constraints but in a quite inefficient way. In practice, they 
check all the integrity constraints at the end of the proof for a query, i.e., only when 
the overall set of abductive hypotheses upporting the query has been computed. As 
pointed out by Poole [63], it is better to check consistency as soon as the hypotheses 
are generated. In our proof procedure, we check consistency in an incremental way 
and this is easily done since we have no variable in hypotheses. 
The problem of incremental consistency checking for the generated hypotheses (pos- 
sibly containing variables) is considered in [63] where Poole develops a default and 
abductive reasoning system called Theorist based on a first-order language and an 
abductive resolution-based proof-procedure for it. In Theorist, consistency is immedi- 
ately checked for those hypotheses with no variables and delayed until the end for 
hypotheses containing variables at the time they are generated. An alternative solution 
could be to allow the consistency check to return constraints on the value of variables. 
In [2] the authors define SLX, a top-down derivation procedure for WFSX semantics 
[56] based on the semantic AND-tree characterization of WFSX presented in [3]. The 
derivation procedure has been generalized in [4] to the paraconsistent version of WZCS” 
taking into account general forms of integrity constraints for removing contradiction. 
Basically, the derivation procedure relies on two kinds of derivations: T-derivations, 
proving truth, and TU-derivations proving non-falsity. Shifting from one to the other 
is required for proving a default literal not L: the T-derivation of not L succeeds iff 
the TU-derivation of L fails; the TU-derivation of not L succeeds iff the T-derivation 
of L fails. Moreover, T-derivation of not L succeeds if T-derivation of 1L succeeds 
(thus taking into account the coherence principle), and T&derivation of L fails if 
T-derivation of -L succeeds. 
The procedure is amenable to a simple implementation. To guarantee termination, 
suitable rules are introduced that prune the search space and eliminate both cyclic 
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positive recursion and cyclic negative recursion. This procedure has several similarities 
with the procedure procedure by Eshghi and Kowalski [42] and therefore ours, even 
if these procedures do not treat positive recursion and non-cyclic negative recursion. 
In fact, abductive and consistency derivation resemble T-derivation and TLJ-derivation, 
respectively. However, two big differences can be pointed out: first, our procedure does 
not take into account the coherence principle and, second, does not compute the WFSX, 
but the abductive models. 
8. Conclusions 
We presented a semantics which uniformly integrates abduction and two kinds of 
negation in a logic programming setting. 
A model-theoretic semantics is defined in terms of Herbrand models, and equipped 
with an interpretation in terms of argumentation. A model-theoretic semantics based on 
Herbrand models is a widely accepted concept in the logic programming community, 
which also accounts for interesting properties such as compositionality and program 
equivalence. 
A distinguishing property of our semantic framework is that it is defined for any 
non-contradictory program, and is strictly related to well-known semantics for the con- 
sidered extensions, namely abduction, negation by default and pseudo negation, when 
taken separately. The case of logic programming extended with negation by default is 
recovered by considering an abductive logic program (P, Ab,ZC) where P is a normal 
logic program viewed as a positive one, Ab = { } and ZC = {}. In this case, any 
interpretation is non-contradictory and the abductive semantics here defined coincides 
with the 3-valued stable model semantics. The resulting semantic framework is that 
presented in [20]. The set of abductive models correspond to the set of 3-valued stable 
models [64] (or stationary expansions [65], or complete scenaria [35], being they all 
equivalent as proved in [20]). All the other results presented in [20] hold. In particular, 
total complete supported models correspond to Gelfond-Lifschitz’s stable models [44]. 
Extended logic programs can be dealt with in the abductive framework by view- 
ing negated literals la as new positive atoms ul, and enforcing a suitable non- 
contradictoriness condition to capture the meaning of pseudo negation. In particular, 
the case of extended logic programming can be recovered by considering an abductive 
logic program (P,Ab,ZC) where P is an extended logic program viewed as a positive 
one, Ab = { } and IC = {t a,a’)Vu E _Y’+}. 
We prove that for an extended logic program P, the set of its complete models 
captures 3-valued stable semantics [64], and that the contradiction-removal semantics 
coincides with the complete scenarios semantics for extended logic programs of [41]. 
Moreover, the total complete models capture the answer set semantics [45]. 
Therefore the abductive semantics given here can be considered a common ground 
where two kinds of negation and abduction - and their associated semantics - can be 
formally compared and uniformly integrated. 
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We equipped our abductive framework with a query-based, correct proof-procedure 
in order to provide a schema for an abstract interpreter for the language. This procedure 
is, in practice, that defined by Kakas and Mancarella, and coincides with that defined 
by Eshghi and Kowalski when normal logic programs are considered. Of course, in 
order to transform the procedure to a real algorithmic issues such as search and loop 
checking should be treated. This would be the subject for future work. 
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